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ANOTHER LOOK AT UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is undergoing a re-
vival and metamorphosis that have significantly expanded its applica-
tion. Generally, the doctrine states that while a government, state
or federal, may not be obligated to provide its citizens with a certain
benefit or privilege, it may not grant the benefit or privilege on con-
ditions requiring the recipient in some manner to relinquish his
constitutional rights.' Furthermore, it cannot withhold or cancel the
benefit as a price for the assertion of such rights.
Recent cases have focused on the second aspect of the doctrine,
that which proscribes penalizing the exercise of a constitutional right.'
The concern has been not only with the fundamental unfairness of any
such penalty,' but also with the deterrent effect that the exaction of
such a price has on the exercise of the right.' Denial of the benefit to
individuals operates as a subtle but nonetheless potent form of com-
pulsion on them to forego asserting their constitutional rights.'
As government has become increasingly involved in supplying
such vital benefits to the population as jobs, housing, welfare, and
education,' opportunities for substantial inhibition and suppression
of the exercise of constitutional rights have multiplied. While the
relevance of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions to such areas
of governmental bounty and activity have been explored elsewhere,7
1 For general discussions of the early cases expounding the doctrine see Hale,
Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional Rights, 35 COLUm. L. Rxv. 321 (1935);
Merrill, Unconstitutional Conditions, 77 U. PA. L. Rnv. 879 (1929) ; Oppenheim,
Unconstitutional Conditions and State Powers, 26 MIcH. L. REv. 176 (1927). For
more recent treatments see French, Unconstitutional Conditions: An Analysis, 50 GEO.
L. J. 234 (1961); O'Neill, Unconstitutional Conditions: Welfare Benefits with Strings
Attached, 54 CALIF. L. Ruv. 443 (1966); Wilcox, Invasions of the First Anmendment
Through Conditioned Public Spending, 41 CORNELL L.Q. 12 (1955) ; Note, Unconsti-
tutional Conditions, 73 HARV. L. Rxv. 1595 (1960); Note, Judicial Acquiescence
in the Forfeiture of Constitutional Rights Through Expansion of the Conditioned
Privilege Doctrine, 28 IN. L.J. 520 (1953).
2 See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968) ; Spevack v. Klein, 385
U.S. 511, 515 (1967) ; Patton v. North Carolina, 381 F.2d 636 (4th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 905 (1968) ; Smartt v Avery 370 F.2d 788, 799 (6th Cir. 1967);
cf. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965).
SSee Patton v. North Carolina, 381 F.2d 636 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 905 (1968).
4See United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968) ; Garrity v. New Jersey,
385 U.S. 493, 496-97 (1967) ; Patton v. North Carolina, 381 F.2d 636, 639 (4th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 905 (1968) ; Smartt v. Avery, 370 F.2d 788, 790 (6th Cir.
1967).
See Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 496 (1967) ; Spevack v. Klein, 385
U.S. 511, 516 (1967).
6 On the scope and significance of governmental largess, see Reich, Individual
Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245 (1965);
Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 779-82 (1964).
7 See generally O'Neill, supra note 1; Wilcox, supra note 1.
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this Comment will focus primarily on the doctrine's emerging ap-
plicability to the conditioning of more subtle forms of governmental
benefits, such as leniency in sentencing, and allowance of probation.
Factual situations in recent cases involving such benefits are strikingly
different from those in which the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions
originated. It is particularly important to isolate the delimiting factors
in the doctrine in order to provide guideposts for its operation in
new contexts.
A GLANCE BACKWARD
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions arose from a need to
limit the notion that, since the government might completely withhold
a particular benefit, it could therefore offer the benefit on any con-
dition whatsoever. It was argued that the power to withhold neces-
sarily included the lesser power to grant on chosen conditions.' Since
the individual could escape the condition by rejecting the benefit, it was
reasoned that any restrictions on constitutional rights were voluntarily
assumed by the recipient." Thus arose a distinction based on a
dichotomy between right and privilege. Where a certain benefit could
be labeled as one enjoyed as a matter of right, its enjoyment could not
be arbitrarily conditioned; on the other hand, if the benefit were only
a privilege bestowed at the grace of the state, conditioning would be
permitted.1
Concern for the dilution of individual rights that might be effected
through conditioned benefits was forcefully expressed by the Supreme
Court as early as 1926:
If the state may compel the surrender of one constitutional
right as a condition of its favor, it may, in like manner,
compel a surrender of all. It is inconceivable that guaranties
embedded in the Constitution of the United States may thus
be manipulated out of existence."-
Accordingly, subsequent courts for the most part have not been per-
suaded by arguments founded upon the absolute power of government
to withhold certain benefits. On the contrary, it has been recognized
that the denial or revocation of benefits if certain conditions are not
met is essentially regulatory activity by government, which must find
compelling justification if constitutional rights are thereby restricted.'
8 E.g., Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 48 (1897).
o McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517, 518
(1892).
10 Packard v. Banton, 264 U.S. 140, 145 (1924).
11 Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 594 (1926).
I'2 See cases cited notes 22 & 23 infra. Lawson v. Housing Authority, 270 Wis.
269, 276, 70 N.W.2d 605, 609, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 882 (1955), disparages the dis-
tinction between "vested rights" and "privileges."
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In discussing those contexts in which the doctrine of uncon-
stitutional conditions has been successfully utilized to check assertions
of unlimited governmental power, it is useful to delineate four broad
areas of benefits and center attention on them: (1) the privilege of
foreign corporations to engage in local business; (2) the use of public
property and facilities; (3) the receipt of benefits; and (4) govern-
mental employment.
The Privilege of Foreign Corporations To Engage in Local Business
Regulation of foreign corporations desirous of conducting busi-
ness within a state provided the breeding ground for the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions.3 In 1839, the Supreme Court, in Bank
of Augusta v. Earle,'4 announced the rigid principle that a state has
the power to exclude foreign corporations from conducting business
within its borders. It was thought that from the power to exclude
naturally flowed the power to allow entry on even the most unreason-
able conditions "5 and the power to revoke a corporation's license in a
similarly arbitrary manner. Later, however, while still conceding that
states could refuse permission to conduct local business, the Supreme
Court held that a state could not grant the privilege on a condition that
amounted to a tax on out-of-state corporate property without violating
due process and imposing a restraint on interstate commerce. ]Erosion
of the permissive approach of Bank of Augusta was continued by
decisions restraining the state's power to condition a corporation's
entry upon the waiver of the right to remove actions to the federal
courts. It was first held that states could not specifically enforce such
a waiver." In Terral v. Burke Construction Co.,'" the Court went one
13See generally G. HENDERSON, THE POSITION OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS IN
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 178-87 (1918).
1438 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839); see Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168
(1869).
15 See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1, 53-54 (1910) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) ; Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404, 407 (1856).
16 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1 (1910), which involved a fran-
chise tax on a corporation's entire authorized capital stock. See Western Union Tel.
Co. v. Foster, 247 U.S. 105 (1918) ; cf. Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U.S.
389, 400-401 (1928) (right to withhold permission from a foreign corporation to do
local business did not enable state to condition privilege of entry on denial of equal
protection through discriminatory taxation).
A state may not exclude a corporation from doing interstate business within its
borders. Union Pac. R.R. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 248 U.S. 67 (1918) ; Pullman Co.
v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 56, 62 (1910) (decided two weeks after Western Union Tel. Co. v.
Kansas, vrpra).
17 Insurance Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445 (1874).
18257 U.S. 529 (1922), overruling Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co., 94 U.S. 535
(1876), and Security Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Prewitt, 202 U.S. 246 (1906). The dis-
senting Justices in Security Mutual, supra, had emphatically stated: "In our view no
state enactment can lawfully abridge this right or destroy it, directly or indirectly, by
affixing heavy penalties to its assertion by those lawfully entitled to its enjoyment."
202 U.S. at 269 (Day & Harlan, JJ., dissenting).
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step further and held that the state could not revoke the license because
of the exercise of the right to removal.
These cases, which checked a power once thought to be virtually
absolute, reflected the Court's increasing sensitivity to two basically
national interests: unimpeded economic growth, and the smooth
functioning of the federal system. It is not accidental that the doctrine
was successfully invoked in support of a right so vital to corporate
defense against local economic interests at a time of great national
commercial expansion. 19
The Use of Public Property and Facilities
The Court in Davis v. Massachusetts2 upheld an ordinance that
prohibited public speaking in a municipal park without a permit from
the mayor. The rationale of the decision was that since ownership of
the land gave the municipality the right to withhold access completely,
it could grant access on any conditions, including those restricting first
amendment freedoms.2 Such superficial and deceptive logic was later
vitiated by cases that viewed the manipulation of access to public
property, especially city streets and traffic ways, as affirmative regu-
latory activity subject to constitutional attack. Burdens on free com-
munication of ideas have been found in governmental conditions re-
stricting the dissemination of literature and opinion,' and the vesting
of administrative officials with broad power to restrict the distribution
of pamphlets and handbills."3 Control over access to state property
has also been held insufficient justification for the conversion by
legislative fiat of a private intrastate trucking company into a common
carrier subject to increased regulation and public liabilities. 4 Such
an act was held to be a violation of the constitutional prohibitions
19 See Merrill, supra note 1, at 881-82; Oppenheim, supra note 1, at 178; Note,
Unconstitutional Conditions, supra note 1, at 1607. An analogy to the invalidation
of state regulation that thwarts the federal system has been found in the holding of
ordinary contracts to be void as against public policy. See French, supra note 1, at
235; Hale, supra note 1, at 325.
20 167 U.S. 43 (1897).
21 Id. at 48.
22 See Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1942) ; Schneider v. New Jersey,
308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939) ; Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 497, 514-516 (1939); cf. Saia v.
New York, 334 U.S. 558, 561 n.2 (1948) ; Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 505 (1946).
These cases have effectively drained Davis of vitality, although it has not been over-
ruled. Compare these cases with Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966), where the
Court upheld restrictions on access to a jail driveway against first amendment ob-
jections.
2 See, e.g., Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938).
24Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583 (1926). The
Court there relied on Michigan Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Duke, 266 U.S. 570 (1925),
where a similar requirement imposed on a corporation doing exclusively interstate
business was invalidated primarily because it imposed an "unreasonable condition
precedent" to engaging in interstate commerce. Id. at 577. However, an alternative
holding was that the condition converted property used exclusively in a private carrier
business into a public utility by legislative fiat in violation of the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 578.
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against taking property without just compensation and in an arbitrary
manner.2 5
Danskin v. San Diego Unified School District 6 invalidated a
requirement that limited use of a school auditorium to persons
subscribing to a loyalty oath. In compelling officials to allow public
use without the condition, the California Supreme Court said: "A
state is without power to impose an unconstitutional requirement as a
condition for granting a privilege even though the privilege is the use
of state property." "1 After probing the legislative justifications for the
imposition of the condition, Mr. Justice Traynor concluded that
the Legislature denies access to . . . "subversive elements,"
not because it believes that their public meetings would
create a clear and present danger to the community, but
because it believes that the privilege of free assembly in a
school building should be denied to those whose convictions
and affiliations it does not tolerate? 8
The Receipt of Benefits
A catalogue of the gratuitous benefits now offered by govern-
mental agencies would be extensive. Possibilities for undermining
individual liberties under such circumstances are of similar magnitude.
25 In Frost, the Court was bound by a construction of the California Supreme
Court which announced what to the Court was a clearly improper statutory purpose
of attempting to control competition. 271 U.S. at 591. This explains why what one
might have expected to have been construed as a valid regulatory act of a state over
intrastate commerce was nevertheless held to be an unconstitutional condition. Compare
Frost with Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251 (1932), and cases cited note 52 infra.
2628 Cal. 2d 536, 171 P.2d 885 (1946).
27 Id. at 545-46, 171 P.2d at 891.
28 Id. at 545, 171 P.2d at 891. In American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339
U.S. 382 (1950), the Supreme Court upheld a statute denying the use of National
Labor Relations Board facilities to labor organizations whose officers failed to file
non-Communist affidavits. This decision is characterized by judicial deference to the
legislative judgment that the purposes of the benefits would be effectively subverted if
persons with such beliefs were to gain access. The essential question was succinctly
posed by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who concurred in the Court's decision except as to
its approval of certain vague, but separable parts of § 9(h) of the Labor-Management
Relations Act of 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 146, repealed by Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act of 1959, § 201 (d), 73 Stat. 525.
The essential question now is whether Congress may determine that mem-
bership of union officers in the Communist Party creates such an obvious
hazard to the peace-promoting purposes of the Act that access to the machinery
of the Act may be denied unions which prefer their freedom to have officers
who are Communists to their opportunities under the Act.
339 U.S. at 417-18 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
However, United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965), implicitly overruled
Douds on the point that Communists, or any named group, can be specifically singled
out as dangerous to the labor movement and on that count deprived of a benefit. Brown
held that such a legislative judgment inflicted punishment without trial in violation of
the constitutional prohibition against bills of attainder. Section 504 of the Labor-
Management Reporting & Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. § 504 (1964), which was
the successor to § 9(h), was held unconstitutional. This section, in addition to with-
holding union office from past and current members of the Communist Party, subjected
them to prosecution. 381 U.S. at 458.
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Cases where an unconstitutional condition analysis has been applied
to forestall such an impact have involved such diverse benefits as un-
employment compensation,m welfare funds, ° public housing,"- tax
exemptions, 2 public education,3 and the mail service.34 Challenges
directed to conditions attached to these benefits have usually been
framed and sustained on a violation of first amendment freedoms, 5
which in recent years have been zealously guarded against both direct
and indirect invasion.
36
With these benefits a high degree of relevance has been demanded
between the imposition of the condition and the furtherance of the
purposes of the benefit. For instance, in striking down a loyalty oath
required pursuant to a federal statute dealing with public housing, one
court stated:
Counsel for the defendant Authority have failed to point out
to this court how the occupation of any units of a federally
aided housing project by tenants who may be members of
a subversive organization threatens the successful operation
of such housing projects."
Governmental Employment
Constitutional objection to requirements set for government em-
ployees was seemingly foreclosed by McAuliffe v. Mayor of New
Bedford,as where Oliver Wendell Holmes, then Chief Justice of the
29 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963). See also Syrek v. California
Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 54 Cal. 2d 519, 532, 354 P.2d 625, 632, 7 Cal. Rptr.
97, 104 (1960).
30 Parrish v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 66 Cal. 2d 260, 270, 425 P.2d 223, 230, 57 Cal.
Rptr. 623, 630 (1967).
In Randolph v. United States, 274 F. Supp. 200 (M.D.N.C. 1967), aff'd per
curiam, 389 U.S. 570 (1968), the plaintiff unsuccessfully argued that a requirement
that all but nominal attorneys' fees in Social Security Act proceedings be approved by
the Secretary for Health, Education, and Welfare effectively deprived an individual
of the right to counsel because attorneys were discouraged from handling such cases.
The court held, however, that there is no constitutionally protected right to counsel
during administrative proceedings under the social security system. The court's
analysis leaves something to be desired, since it reasoned from the premise that since
Congress could entirely prohibit the use of attorneys during the proceedings, it could
subject their fees to regulation.
31 Lawson v. Housing Authority, 270 Wis. 269, 70 N.W.2d 605, cert. denied, 350
U.S. 882 (1955).
32 First Unitarian Church v. County of Los Angeles, 357 U.S. 545 (1958) ; Speiser
v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519-20 (1958).
3 Dixon v. Alabama Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 156 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 930 (1961).
34 Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 309-10 (1965) (unconstitutional
condition on first amendment rights to require addressee of certain subversive material
to specifically request delivery of each piece of mail).
35 But see cases cited notes 30, 33 supra.
36See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 405 (1963).
3 7 Lawson v. Housing Authority, 270 Wis. 269, 287, 70 N.W.2d 605, 615, cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 882 (1955) ; cf. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 527 (1958).
38 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
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Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, stated: "The Petitioner may
have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional
right to be a policeman." " Later courts, however, have found that
both state and federal statutes may impose unconstitutional burdens on
employees despite their inability to claim any abstract right to public
employment.4" The focus has been on whether the condition bars
individuals in a "patently arbitrary and discriminatory manner" in
violation of due process 4 and on whether, in withholding or revoking
employment under conditions capable of sweeping and improper appli-
cation, the state is violating specific constitutional freedoms by deter-
ring or penalizing their exercise.' In Elfbrandt v. Russell,43 the
Supreme Court invalidated a state loyalty oath system that, in addition
to denying employment to non-affiants, provided for discharge and
perjury penalties for those who at the time of subscribing to the oath
or afterwards were "knowing" members of an organization advocating
the violent overthrow of the government. Penalizing "mere knowing
membership," ' without requiring a "specific intent" to further illegal
aims, was found to infringe on first amendment freedoms by arriving
at "guilt by association." " While in Elfbrandt the threat of subse-
quent prosecution loomed large to the Court, in a subsequent case a
statutory loyalty clearance system applied to public school teachers
was struck down for vagueness where the only apparent sanction for
noncompliance or violation was dismissal or failure to hire.4"
These decisions severely restrict the state's power to make asso-
ciation and belief a relevant consideration governing the fitness for
employment of teachers, at least. They may cast doubt on the viability
of the Court's decision in United Public Workers v. Mitchell,47 which
upheld federal restrictions on political activities of civil servants. The
conditions embodied in the Hatch Act 4 were construed to be reason-
able efforts by Congress to promote the efficiency, integrity, and dis-
3 9 Id. at 220, 29 N.E. at 517.
40 See, e.g., Torasco v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 496 (1961).
41 Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 194 (1952) (Black, J., concurring); see
Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 369 (1964) ; Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368
U.S. 278, 288 (1961); Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 557-58
(1956). The right to hold a specific employment and to follow a chosen profession
free from unreasonable governmental interference comes within the "liberty" and
"property" concepts of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. See Greene v. McElroy,
360 U.S. 474, 492 (1959).
42 E.g., Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966). Again, the emphasis in recent
years has been on first amendment freedoms. An extensive analysis of the constitu-
tional infirmities of governmental loyalty oaths appears in Note, Loyalty Oaths, 77
YALE L.J. 739 (1968).
43 384 U.S. 11 (1966).
44 Id. at 16.
45 Id. at 19.
46 Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
47 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
48 18 U.S.C. §§ 591-612 (1964).
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cipline of the civil service. In view of the increasing tendency of the
Court to override legislative judgment in the sensitive first amendment
area, however, it is not unlikely that the envisioned danger to the
public service and the public interest will pale in view of the broad
sweep of the statute.49
GENERAL APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE
An examination of the cases involving arguments that unconsti-
tutional conditions have been attached to state-proffered benefits in-
dicates that the decisions have turned on analysis of four general
variables: (1) the nature of the right affected, (2) the degree of
infringement of the right, (3) the nature of the benefit offered, and
(4) the strength and nature of the state's interest in conditioning
the benefit.
As has been seen, the early cases evidence concern for the rights
of corporations in situations where states exerted regulatory power
that had a potentially disruptive effect on the federal system and the
national economy. The apex of protection under the doctrine for
rights bound up with economic interests was reached in Frost & Frost
Trucking Co. v. Railroad Commission50 where a state statute regu-
lating private carriers was held unconstitutional. The Court char-
acterized the state's primary purpose as protection of the "business of
those who are common carriers in fact by controlling competitive
conditions." " While subsequent cases have eviscerated the holding
of Frost in the context of state regulation of business,' Frost has
4 9 See United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967), where a section of the Sub-
versive Activities Control Act making it unlawful for any member of a Communist-
action organization "to engage in any employment in any defense facility," was held
to put a substantial burden on first amendment rights because it was drawn much
more broadly than could be warranted by national security. Id. at 266; cf. Bagley v.
Washington Township Hosp. Dist, 65 Cal. 2d 499, 421 P.2d 409, 55 Cal. Rptr. 401
(1966) ; Fort v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 61 Cal 2d 331, 392 P.2d 385, 38 Cal. Rptr. 625
(1964). Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968), offers enlightenment in
its dicta. The Court held unconstitutional the dismissal of a school teacher for
writing a letter, published in a local newspaper, containing false allegations critical of
her superiors. The Court rejected the argument that public employment could be
conditioned on the relinquishment of the first amendment right to comment on matters
of public interest. But the Court stated:
At the same time it cannot be gainsaid that the State has interests as an em-
ployer in regulating the speech of its employees that differ significantly from
those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry
in general. The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the
interests of the teacher, as a citizen, . . . and the interest of the State, as
an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs
through its employees.
Id. at 568.
o271 U.S. 583 (1926).
51 Id. at 591.
5 See Fordham Bus Corp. v. United States, 41 F. Supp. 712, 715 (S.D.N.Y.
1941) ; notes 24 & 25 supra. See also the following decisions upholding state regulation
of businesses over due process objections: Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S.
483 (1955); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Nebbia v. New
York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
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continuing vitality in its emphasis on the drastic effect that the con-
ditioning of benefits can have on an individual's constitutional rights1
3
The bulk of cases utilizing the unconstitutional condition analysis
have involved first amendment freedoms.' Presently, this is an area
where even the most indirect invasions on rights will be given pains-
taking attention. In Sherbert v. Verner,,5 the Court stated:
It is basic that no showing merely of a rational relationship to
some colorable state interest would suffice; in this highly
sensitive constitutional area, "[o]nly the gravest abuses,
endangering paramount interests, give occasion for per-
missible limitation . . . .. 6
The Court there held South Carolina's unemployment compensation
act unconstitutional as applied to a Seventh Day Adventist who was
excluded from benefits as not "available for work" -" when she could
not find a job releasing her from work on her sabbath, Saturday.
Under the Court's analysis, withholding benefits under such conditions
created a pressure to forego religious practice and a burden tantamount
to a fine, even though punitive intent was absent.5
Decisions concerning the gratuitous benefits provided by govern-
ment, as well as contractual benefits such as employment, have strug-
gled to find a justifiable relation between the benefit and a condition
based on belief or advocacy. For example, while the disloyalty of
employees in sensitive positions may under certain circumstances
present a very real danger, it is difficult to discern the public threat
posed by the possession of tax exemptions by disloyal individuals.
Where governmental bounty is involved, some courts have found
not only a lack of justification for the condition in terms of the
purposes of the benefit, but further, an intentional suppression of first
amendment rights. 9
53 But see the remarks of one writer soon after the Frost decision, suggesting that
the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions should have been confined in application to
those privileges bound up with the federal system, leaving the doctrine of actual co-
ercion to deal with individual rights: "In fact our whole societal order rests upon the
presuppostion that in dealing with his fellows and with private organizations [the
individual] will bargain away his constitutional immunities, and that the bargains will
be given legal effect." Merrill, supra note 1, at 893.
5
4 See, e.g., Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965); Torasco v.
Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961); Bagley v. Washington Township Hosp. Dist., 65 Cal.
2d 499, 421 P.2d 409, 55 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1966); Fort v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 61 Cal. 2d
331, 392 P.2d 385, 38 Cal. Rptr. 625 (1964); Danskin v. San Diego Unified School
Dist., 28 Cal. 2d 536, 171 P.2d 885 (1946).
5 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
6 Id. at 406 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)). See also
Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 56-80 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting), express-
ing the viewpoint that no state interest can justify limitation on first amendment
freedoms.
57 374 U.S. at 400.
58 Id. at 404.
59 See, e.g., Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 310 (1965) (Brennan,
J., concurring) ; Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519 (1958) ; Danskin v. San Diego
Unified School Dist., 28 Cal. 2d 536, 546-48, 171 P.2d 885, 891-93 (1946).
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While the nature of the right and the degree of infringement
wrought by the state's requirement are of paramount importance, the
validity of the requirement is also likely to be affected by the kind
of benefit to which the condition is attached. The doctrine of un-
constitutional conditions has most often been applied to broad-scale
governmental benefits on which large numbers of people depend. In
invalidating the requirement of a loyalty oath for occupancy of public
housing, the Wisconsin Supreme Court noted that if
[a] government, or agency thereof, owned 90 per cent of
the rental units available for private housing in the nation as
a whole, or even in a particular state or municipality, the
number of people subjected to pressure by such a plan, of
requiring a certificate of non-membership as a condition of
tenancy, would be very considerable.6"
Influenced by such considerations, the Supreme Court, in ruling
certain applications and constructions of the federal postal law uncon-
stitutional, has stressed the indispensability of the postal system to
individuals. In Lamont v. Postmaster General," the Court noted that
the use of the mails is almost as much a part of free speech as the
right to use our tongues, and observed:
"Whatever may have been the voluntary nature of the postal
system in the period of its establishment, it is now the main
artery through which the business, social, and personal
affairs of the people are conducted and upon which depends
in a greater degree than upon any other activity of govern-
ment the promotion of the general welfare." '
Another distinct area of benefits the courts have guarded against
unconstitutional conditions is that involving livelihood, including pro-
fessional and occupational licenses, governmental employment, and
unemployment compensation. The threat of disbarment, for instance,
has been considered by the Supreme Court to be a powerful instrument
of compulsion to make a lawyer relinquish his privilege against self-
incrimination."3  And the choice between forfeiting a job or incrim-
inating oneself has been held to produce "coerced" statements in-
0 Lawson v. Housing Authority, 270 Wis. 269, 275, 70 N.W.2d 605, 609, cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 882 (1955).
61381 U.S. 301 (1965). See also Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 156
(1946), where the Court construed a condition attached to a benefit (a subsidy granted
through lower second-class postal rates) narrowly in order to avoid "grave constitu-
tional questions." See United States ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing
Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 430-32, 437-38 (1921) (Holmes & Brandeis, JJ., dis-
senting).
02 381 U.S. at 305 n.3, quoting Pike v. Walker, 121 F.2d 37, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
3 See Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 516 (1967), discussed at notes 161-63 infra
and accompanying text.
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admissible for evidentiary purposes." Similar emphasis on the
importance of a benefit to the individual involved is evident in Sherbert
v. Verner,5 where the Court alluded to the unmistakable pressure to
forego religious practice inherent in the withholding of unemployment
benefits. 6
Generally, the less essential the benefit being denied to an indi-
vidual for exercising (or refusing to waive) a constitutional right, the
less likely it is that courts will find a condition attached to it uncon-
stitutional. When conditions are attached to benefits about which indi-
viduals are relatively indifferent, the potential for coercion is obviously
small. Thus, individual choice is relatively unfettered. The element
that tips the scales to indicate an unconstitutional condition is deterrent
potential,6 7 which can only be significant to the extent that an indi-
vidual is reluctant to forego the benefit.
Although a compelling state interest may justify upholding a
condition in many cases, if the condition is directed at suppressing
individual liberties protected by the Constitution, it will always fall.68
First, the condition will have little if any relevance to the fulfillment of
any legitimate interests a state may have had in offering the benefit.
Second, it would seem a clear violation of due process for the state
64Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 496-97 (1967), discussed at notes 147-60
infra and accompanying text.
6374 U.S. 398 (1963).
66Id. at 404.
6 See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) ; ef. United States v. Jackson,
390 U.S. 570, 581-85 (1968).
18 Consider the remarks of Mr. Justice Stewart, writing for the majority in
United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581-82 (1968) :
If the provision had no other purpose or effect than to chill the assertion of
constitutional rights by penalizing those who choose to exercise them, then it
would be patently unconstitutional. But, as the Government notes, limiting
the death penalty to cases where the jury recommends its imposition does have
another objective: It avoids the more drastic alternative of mandatory capital
punishment in every case.
The Court held the condition invalid, in spite of the "legitimate" legislative goal,
because it needlessly penalized the assertion of fifth and sixth amendment rights when
there existed alternative methods, not burdening constitutional rights, for achieving
the goal.
In United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), the Court may have clarified
its position on the relevance of legislative motive to the constitutionality of a statute.
The federal prohibition against destroying draft cards was upheld as effectuating a
substantial administrative interest of the Government by appropriately narrow means.
The Court refused to examine the legislative motive, stating: "It is a familiar principle
of constitutional law that this Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional
statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive." Id. at 383. However, the
Court distinguished those cases where "the inevitable effect of a statute on its face
may render it unconstitutional," id. at 384, and also carved out bill of attainder cases
where "the very nature of the constitutional question" requires such an inquiry. Id. at
383 n.30.
The Court nevertheless went on to examine evidence on congressional motives,
and found it inconclusive, id. at 385-86, a conclusion characterized by one commen-
tator as "unsupportable." Emerson, Freedom of Expression in Wartime, 116 U. PA.
L. REv. 975, 1001 n.82 (1968).
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to intentionally punish constitutionally protected conduct.' Thus, in
Speiser v. Randall,"0 the Court implied that denial of the veterans'
tax exemption because of expression that could not be the basis for
criminal prosecution would be prohibited under the first amendment."'
Because the Court could find no recognizable danger to any legitimate
state interest posed by disloyal veterans' possessing tax benefits, 72 denial
was recognized to be a form of punishment. Had such an interest
been shown, the Court might have viewed the penalty as incidental
and indirect and gone on to weigh the substantiality of the first amend-
ment infringement against the significance of the state's interest. 3
Similarly, in the earlier case of Hague v. CIO,74 the Supreme Court
had viewed the matter in much the same way. The ordinance in
question forbade the distribution of printed matter and the holding
of meetings in streets and public places without a permit.75 The state
apparently sought to justify the ordinance as a "general measure to
69See Steinberg v. United States, 163 F. Supp. 590, 592 (Ct Cl. 1958), where
the court held unconstitutional a statute denying a retirement annuity to anyone in-
voking the fifth amendment before a federal investigating committee, because it was
based on an arbitrary and unreasonable discrimination. Cf. Slochower v. Board of
Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956). An alternative holding was that the act con-
stituted a bill of attainder since it inflicted punishment without trial of guilt. 163 F.
Supp. at 592. But cf. Clay v. United States, No. 24991, at 41-48 (5th Cir. May 6,
1968); Thompson v. Gleason, 317 F.2d 901, 907 (D.C. Cir. 1962). On bill of at-
tainders, see generally Comment, The Supreme Court's Bill of Attainder Doctrine:
A Need for Clarification, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 212 (1966); Note, The Bill of Attainder
Clauses and Legislative and Administrative Suppression of "Subversives," 67 COLUMd.
L. RLv. 1490 (1967).
70357 U.S. 513 (1958).
71Id. at 518-19.
72 Characterizing the statutory purpose as punitive, the Court accepted the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court's construction of the oath as barring only those who could be
criminally punished for advocacy. Id. at- 519. It held that procedural due process
was violated by requiring those the state sought to punish to bear the burden of proving
their innocence.
It would seem, however, that the Supreme Court's decision in Flemming v. Nestor,
363 U.S. 603 (1960), is inconsistent with Speiser. Fleminng held it not a violation
of the fifth amendment due process clause to deny accrued old-age social security
benefits to the resident wife of an alien who had been deported for engaging in Com-
munist activities. His activities could not have been a basis for forfeiture or deporta-
tion either at the time they occurred or at the time he began participating in the social
security program. Yet, the Court reasoned that since the Government was only "with-
holding . . . a noncontractual benefit under a social welfare program," id. at 611,
no vested right was withdrawn, and thus due process was not violated. Furthermore,
since withdrawal of such a benefit did not constitute punishment, the statute was not a
bill of attainder. Id. at 619. Speiser, on the other hand, avoids reasoning from such
conclusory terms as "vested rights." See 357 U.S. at 518. United States v. Brown,
381 U.S. 437, 448 (1965), indicates that the Court is taking a more expansive approach
to the concept of punishment.
73 The Speiser Court, for example, distinguished American Communications Ass'n
v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950), on the basis that although the conditions there did in
fact discourage the exercise of first amendment freedoms, the regulation was justified
in order to prevent the purposes of the benefit from being undermined and the benefit
from being used to the detriment of the public. 357 U.S. at 527; see note 28 supra;
Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 54 (1961), where Mr. Justice Harlan stated
that Speiser was "explicitly limited so as not to reach cases where, as here, there is
no showing of an intent to penalize beliefs."
74307 U.S. 496 (1939).
75Id. at 515.
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promote the public convenience in the use of the streets or parks," "I
but the Court characterized it as "directed solely at the exercise of the
right of speech and assembly." 77
Even though there is a recognizably detrimental effect on consti-
tutional rights, when a concrete state interest exists the use of a
balancing test is inescapable. Where a court is dealing with a legis-
lative enactment, a presumption of the validity of legislative judgment
must be recognized."5 But even though the statute may effectuate a
legitimate state interest, if it needlessly burdens the assertion of rights,
it is constitutionally defective.79
Perhaps the clearest statement of the factors to be weighed is in
Bagley v. Washington Township Hospital District,8" where the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court invalidated a provision of the state's civil
service statute prohibiting political activity and reinstated a nurse
dismissed under the statute. The court stated:
Not only must the conditions annexed to the enjoyment
of a publicly-conferred benefit reasonably tend to further the
purposes sought by conferment of that benefit but also the
utility of imposing the conditions must manifestly outweigh
any resulting impairment of constitutional rights. Further,
in imposing conditions upon the enjoyment of publicly
conferred benefits, as in the restriction of constitutional
rights by more direct means, the state must establish the
unavailability of less offensive alternatives and demonstrate
that the conditions are drawn with narrow specificity, re-
stricting the exercise of constitutional rights only to the
extent necessary to maintain the integrity of the program
which confers the benefits.81
United States Supreme Court cases have particularly emphasized
that aspect of the test which requires that conditions be narrowly
76 Id.
7- Id.
78 In Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960), for instance, the Court ob-
viously felt constrained by legislative judgment in upholding the act under the gov-
ernment's power to tax for the general welfare. Cf. note 72 supra.
79 See United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581-82 (1968), quoted note 68, supra.
The Supreme Court there adopted an approach similar to that taken in Dean Milk Co.
v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951), which typifies the application of the doctrine
of the "reasonable alternative" in constitutional law in areas of conflict between
federal commerce power and state regulation.
Excessive intrusion into private interests has been considered to be an independent
due process ground for invalidation. See Struve, Less-Restrictive Alternative Prin-
ciple and Ecoiomic Due Process, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1463 (1967). Additionally, it has
led to a finding of overbreadth in statutes dealing with constitutionally sheltered first
amendment activities. See, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). See
generally Ratner, The Function of the Due Process Clause, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1048,
1082-93 (1968). Jackson considerably extends the potential application of the doctrine.
8065 Cal. 2d 499, 421 P.2d 409, 55 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1966).
8'Id. at 506, 421 P.2d at 415, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 407 (footnotes omitted).
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drawn to meet the envisioned dang&r. Statutes drawn in terms so
broad as to be capable of excluding from the benefit those who would
not endanger its purposes have been invalidated, s as have statutes
embodying such vague standards that an individual must guess as to
what conduct may or may not cause him to lose the benefit.'
In addition to any argument based on a violation of a substantive
constitutional right, it may be argued that a particular condition em-
ploys an arbitrary and irrational classification and thus deprives those
injured of equal protection of the laws.' For example, a poll tax
was struck down because qualifications on voting based on economic
criteria were considered to be without rational justification."' Further-
more, receipt of a benefit may evidently not be conditioned on the
relinquishment of procedural due process in its administration. For
example, it has been held that the privilege of attending a public
educational institution cannot be withdrawn from a student without
notice and opportunity for a hearing. 6
8 See, e.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Elfbrandt v. Russell,
384 U.S. 11 (1967) ; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
83 See Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54 (1967) ; Keyishian v. Board of Regents,
385 U.S. 589 (1967) ; Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
8
4
In Patton v. North Carolina, 381 F.2d 636 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
905 (1968), the alternative ground for decision was that subjecting only defendants ap-
pealing their convictions to the risk of a harsher sentence than originally imposed was
a violation of the equal protection clause because the distinction thus made was not
rational. See notes 127-29 infra and accompanying text; cf. Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384
U.S. 305 (1966), holding that conditioning allowance of transcripts of court proceed-
ings on repayment out of prison salary by unsuccessful appellants violated the equal
protection clause. Not required to pay were those who had been fined, released on
probation, or given suspended sentences. The Court left open the question whether
the statute was a violation of equal protection or due process because it discouraged
appeal by penalizing unsuccessful appellants. Id. at 307-08.
sr Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
In United States v. Seeger, 326 F.2d 846, 854 (2d Cir.), rev'd, 380 U.S. 163
(1964), the circuit court invalidated the federal requirement that an individual must
believe in a supreme being in order to gain conscientious objector status for the armed
services. The condition was held to be an arbitrary and impermissible classification.
The Supreme Court, however, adopted a broad reading of "Supreme Being" and
thereby avoided the constitutional question. Had that not been possible, Mr. Justice
Douglas' concurring opinion indicates that due process and equal protection problems
would have arisen:
If I read the statute differently from the Court, I would have difficulties.
For then those who embraced one religious faith rather than another would
be subject to penalties; and that kind of discrimination, as we held in
Sherbert v. Verner, would violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment. It would also result in a denial of equal protection by preferring
some religions over others-an invidious discrimination that would run afoul
of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
380 U.S. at 188 (Douglas, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
86 Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 156 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 930 (1961). The court was especially sensitive to the significance of the
benefit: 'Without sufficient education the plaintiffs would not be able to earn an ade-
quate livelihood, to enjoy life to the fullest, or to fulfill as completely as possible the
duties and responsibilities of good citizens." 294 F.2d at 157; see Willner v. Committee
on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 102 (1963) (procedural safeguards required when
denying admission to the bar) ; cf. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 518 (1958) (burden of
proof is on group seeking to withhold the benefit).
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To discuss such cases in terms of unconstitutional conditions is
indirect and unilluminating, because the core question will still remain:
whether, in proffering a benefit with a condition attached, due process
or equal protection is being denied. Where, however, the concern is
with discouragement of the exercise of specifically enumerated con-
stitutional rights, the analysis is aided by injecting the concept of
conditioned benefits, for it focuses attention on the pressures inhibiting
free exercise of those rights.
OPERATION OF THE DOCTRINE IN RECENT CASES
Infringement Through Discouragement
As has been seen, it is no answer to the problem posed by benefits
conditioned on a waiver of constitutional rights to say that, since the
recipient can reject the benefit and retain his rights, his rights are not
abridged. Unless the benefit is inconsequential, he will be under
strong pressure to accept the benefit, and it is fair to say that the state
(whether intentionally or not) is encouraging him to forego exercise
of his rights. That there exists an element of coercion in this situation
was first clearly articulated by the Supreme Court in Frost & Frost
Trucking Co. v. Railroad Commission:
s7
[C]onstitutional guaranties, so carefully safeguarded against
direct assault, are open to destruction by the indirect but no
less effective process of requiring a surrender, which, though,
in form voluntary, in fact lacks none of the elements of com-
pulsion. Having regard to form alone, the act here is an
offer to the private carrier of a privilege, which the state
may grant or deny, upon a condition, which the carrier is
free to accept or reject. In reality, the carrier is given no
choice, except a choice between the rock and the whirlpool,-
an option to forego a privilege which may be vital to his
livelihood or submit to a requirement which may constitute
an intolerable burden.88
This thread of thought was picked up in Garrity v. New Jersey,s3
where a state conviction of two policemen was overturned on the
grounds that the incriminating statements utilized at trial were the
product of coercion and therefore inadmissible as evidence under the
fourteenth amendment. The statements had been elicited under the
threat of a state statute requiring the dismissal of a state employee
who refused before an official investigating committee to answer
material questions related to his employment.
87271 U.S. 583 (1926).
88 Id. at 593.
89385 U.S. 493 (1967).
90 Id. at 494.
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It is significant here that the Supreme Court characterized the
choice between forfeiting one's job or incriminating oneself as the
"antithesis of free choice to speak out or to remain silent." 91 In a
companion case involving a lawyer, the Court found the threat of
disbarment a powerful form of compulsion to relinquish the privilege
against self-incrimination. 2
These considerations have appeared in several recent criminal
cases. The Fourth Circuit has declared the practice of allowing
harsher sentences at retrials of defendants who had constitutionally
defective first trials to present an unconstitutional condition:9
3
North Carolina deprives the accused of the constitutional
right to a fair trial, then dares him to assert his right by
threatening him with the risk of a longer sentence. It may
not exact this price. Enjoyment of a benefit or protection
provided by law cannot be conditioned upon the "waiver" of
a constitutional right.'
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit struck down a Tennessee statute providing
that unsuccessful habeas corpus applicants in state or federal courts
would not be eligible to be considered for probation consideration until
a year beyond the usual time.95 Just as the state cannot directly inter-
fere with the right to petition the federal courts for a writ of habeas
corpus,96 the court reasoned, the state cannot discourage its exercise
by withholding a privilege that would otherwise be accorded by state
law. The court observed: "Only a prisoner with an inclination to play
Russian roulette with a year of his life would be likely to file a petition
for writ of habeas corpus under this regulation." " The same con-
sideration was apparent in United States v. Jackson." The federal
kidnaping statute prescribed the death penalty only "if the verdict of
the jury shall so recommend." " On its face, it imposed an unwar-
ranted burden on the exercise of the right to jury trial, thereby serving
9 1 Id. at 497.
92 Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 516 (1967).
93 Patton v. North Carolina, 381 F.2d 636 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 905
(1968).
94381 F.2d at 640 (footnote omitted) ; accord, Gainey v. Turner, 266 F. Supp. 95
(E.D.N.C. 1967) ; see Marano v. United States, 374 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1967). Bid
see United States ex reL Starner v. Russell, 378 F.2d 808 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 889 (1967) ; Shear v. Boles, 263 F. Supp. 855 (N.D. W. Va.), rev'd per curiam,
391 F.2d 609 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 981 (1968) ; cf. United States v.
White, 382 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1052 (1968). The "benefit
or protection" referred to is the state's refraining from opening the sentence for possible
revision.
95 Smartt v. Avery, 370 F.2d 788 (6th Cir. 1967).
96 "[T he state and its officers may not abridge or impair petitioner's right to apply
to a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus." Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 549
(1941).
9
7 Id. at 790.
9s 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
99 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1964).
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to encourage defendants either to plead guilty or to waive jury trial
in order to avoid the death penalty.100
These decisions evidence concern for what may be termed infringe-
ment of a constitutional right through discouragement of its exercise. 10 '
The discouragement comes about through the placing of a penalty on
the assertion of the right and hence a premium on its waiver. Common
sense would indicate that the result of such a combination is pressure.
And, as the importance of the benefit to the individual increases, so
proportionately increases the pressure.
This concept of infringement has been utilized especially in the
area of criminal appeals and postconviction remedies. Although no
court has yet found a constitutional right to appeal guaranteed by the
due process clause, where the "privilege" exists it has been carefully
protected by the courts."°2 In Green v. United States, 3 a defendant
found guilty of second degree murder had successfully appealed his
conviction and, upon retrial, had been convicted of first degree murder
and sentenced to death. The Court held that the fifth amendment's
prohibition against double jeopardy had been violated. Considering
the judgment of second degree murder to include an implicit acquittal
of the charge of first degree murder, the Court reasoned that the
defendant could not be forced to waive his protection against double
jeopardy as a condition of exercising the privilege of appeal.
The law should not, and in our judgment does not, place the
defendant in such an incredible dilemma. Conditioning an
appeal of one offense on a coerced surrender of a valid plea
of former jeopardy on another offense exacts a forfeiture in
plain conflict with the constitutional bar against double
jeopardy.
0 4
100 390 U.S. at 583.
101 See id.: "Congress cannot impose such a penalty in a manner that needlessly
penalizes the assertion of a constitutional right." But cf. id.: "For the evil in the
federal statute is not that it necessarily coerces guilty pleas and jury waivers but
simply that it needlessly encourages them." (Emphasis in original.) Some of the
conceptual difficulty here perhaps stems from the fact that although the statute penal-
ized only the exercise of the sixth amendment right to jury trial, it thereby encouraged
waiver of both that right and the fifth amendment right to plead not guilty. Id. at
581-83.
1'02 See, e.g., Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391
(1963); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956). An interesting expression of the concern for unfettered appeals is Worcester
v. Commissioner, 370 F.2d 713 (1st Cir. 1966), where a prior conviction, from which
the defendant did not appeal because of a judge's promise to place him on probation if
he did not seek review, was held to be tainted and not available to the government
seeking collaterally to estop the defendant from disputing the issue of fraud in a sub-
sequent tax case.
103 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
104 Id. at 193-94 (footnote omitted) ; see People v. Henderson, 60 Cal. 2d 482, 497,
386 P.2d 677, 686, 35 Cal. Rptr. 77, 86 (1963) (applying Green rationale in construing
state constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy) :
A defendant's right of appeal from an erroneous judgment is unreasonably
impaired when he is required to risk his life to invoke that right. Since the
[Vol.117:144
UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS
In an analogous situation, where sentence was passed in defend-
ant's absence, and thus was a violation of procedural due process, the
Fourth Circuit held it unconstitutional to condition correction of that
sentence on the risk of a harsher one.' °5 The defendant had been
sentenced in absentia to three years' imprisonment and placed on
probation. After violating his probation, he was committed to serve
out his term. He attacked the original sentence as invalid because of
his absence; the challenge succeeded and he was placed on probation
for five years. Again violating probation, he was sentenced (still on
the original count) to five years' imprisonment. The court stated:
However, the import of the [District] Court's ruling was to
condition his Constitutional right to seek correction upon the
risk of another sentence, then unforeseeable in nature and
extent. Thus, though not so intending, the Court potentially
penalized him for asserting the privilege. 10G
[The new sentence] was, in sum, the product of a procedure
which could prove either deterring or punitive of an insistence
on Constitutional privileges."
From these cases, it is evident that arguments claiming infringe-
ment through discouragement have been accepted by the courts. Yet
it is legitimate to ask whether discouragement constitutes a "clear,
direct, and material infringement of a specific constitutional guar-
antee." 10" A preliminary question is: How does a court ascertain
whether persons are discouraged from exercising rights as a result
of the conditioned benefit? In the decisions discussed above, the courts
seem simply to have been making a common-sense judgment, based
primarily on consideration of the kind of benefit being manipulated.
Thus, it is not difficult to imagine the deterrent effect of a prospective
death sentence 109 or even the revocation of a corporate license."0 The
court in Patton v. North Carolina " relied in part on statistics indicat-
state has no interest in preserving erroneous judgments, it has no interest in
foreclosing appeals therefrom by imposing unreasonable conditions on the
right to appeal.
105 United States v. Walker, 346 F.2d 428 (4th Cir. 1965).
106 Id. at 430.
107 Id. at 431.
108 This is the question posed by Oppenheim, Unconstitutional Conditions and
State Powers, 26 MicH. L. REv. 176, 186 (1927), writing soon after the decision in
Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comn'n, 271 U.S. 583 (1926).
109 In Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), the Supreme Court, in finding that the
defendant had not knowingly and intelligently waived his right to appeal, explained
the extreme power of that threat: "His was the grisly choice whether to sit content
with life imprisonment or to travel the uncertain avenue of appeal which, if successful,
might well have led to a retrial and death sentence. . . . He declined to play Russian
roulette in this fashion." Id. at 440 (citation omitted).
110 See Terral v. Burke Constr. Co., 257 U.S. 529 (1922), discussed in text ac-
companying note 18 supra.
111 381 F.2d 636 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 905 (1968).
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ing the prevalence of harsher sentencing at North Carolina retrials,"2
and also in part on a letter from a prisoner to the district judge in-
dicating he was afraid to appeal.1
3
Patton illustrates that the conditioning of the benefit does not,
of course, have to be embodied in an explicit statutory scheme. The
potential penalty for appealing resulted from a judicial policy of view-
ing a defective trial (and the sentence passed pursuant to a judgment
of guilt) as a nullity, leaving the new trial a tabula rasa. Furthermore,
the burden arising from the situation was not the certain imposition
of harsher sentence at retrial, but rather the threat of it. However,
when the evil is viewed as the discouragement of the assertion of
rights, this distinction becomes important only in considering the
degree of discouragement.
In the first amendment area, in particular, courts have grappled
with the concept of infringement through discouragement. In
American Communications Association v. Douds,"4 the Supreme
Court said:
[T]he fact that no direct restraint or punishment is imposed
upon speech or assembly does not determine the free speech
question. Under some circumstances, indirect "discourage-
ments" undoubtedly have the same coercive effect upon the
exercise of First Amendment rights as imprisonment, fines,
injunctions or taxes."'
But even though withholding or withdrawing a benefit may
produce a substantial infringement of constitutional rights, there
remains the further consideration of state interest. The pertinent
inquiry is whether the state should be permitted to put the individual
to the choice of giving up a benefit or giving up a constitutional right.
Coercion
The Supreme Court in Garrity v. New Jersey 16 compared the
conditions under which the policemen's statements had been made to
those at which the rule of Miranda v. Arizona was directed, con-
ditions "likely to exert such pressure upon an individual as to disable
him from making a free and rational choice." "' The Court char-
112 381 F.2d at 639 n.8. The court cited a survey revealing that, in 72% of the
retrials occasioned by the denial of counsel at the first trial, defendants were effectively
denied credit for time served. Note, Constitutional Law: Increased Sentence and
Denial of Credit on Retrial Sustained Under Traditional Waiver Theory, 1965 Duxrm
L.J. 395, 399 n.25.
113 381 F.2d at 639 n.7.
114 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
.15Id. at 402; see NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 461 (1958).
116 385 U.S. 493 (1967).




acterized the issue simply in terms of coercion. But to discuss the
issue in terms of actual coercion obscures the important balancing
test that must be incorporated into any decision involving discourage-
ment of the exercise of constitutional rights by withholding or revoking
benefits.:"
The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan in Garrity expresses
sensitivity to the majority's confusion:
The majority is apparently engaged in the delicate task
of riding two unruly horses at once: it is presumably arguing
simultaneously that the statements were involuntary as a
matter of fact, in the same fashion that the statements in
Chambers v. Florida and Haynes v. Washington were
thought to be involuntary, and that the statements were
inadmissible as a matter of law, on the premise that they
were products of an impermissible condition imposed on the
constitutional privilege." 9
Difficult choices are not necessarily unfree ones. Whenever a
benefit is important to a person, he is naturally going to be reluctant to
jeopardize its continued enjoyment, but a choice based on such intense
interest is not necessarily "coerced" in the legal sense. If it were
thought to be, the term would be stretched beyond meaningful limits.
While the deterrent effect on the individual vis-A-vis the assertion of his
rights can be isolated as a rough form of coercion, the pressure should
be tolerated when appropriately justified. When the practice of con-
ditioning benefits operates to penalize the assertion of constitutional
rights and has insufficient redeeming public purpose,120 then it must
be eradicated by a protective ruling in much the same manner as was
done in United States v. Jackson."2 In Jackson, the finding of pres-
sure alone did not conclude the inquiry: "For the evil in the federal
statute is not that it necessarily coerces guilty pleas and jury waivers
but simply that it needlessly encourages them." 's
The Balancing Process
In Smartt v. Avery,' the deterrent effect on the right to petition
for writ of habeas corpus was sufficient reason for the court to in-
validate the challenged regulation. No consideration of any state
3-8 Recently, the Supreme Court acknowledged the necessity to "arrive at a bal-
ance" where the free speech of teachers was in question. Pickering v. Board of Educ.,
391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968), quoted at length in note 49 supra.
"19 385 U.S. at 501 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
120 Of course, if the state's only interest is to discourage the assertion of consti-
tutional rights, the condition is never permissible. See notes 68-69 spra.
121390 U.S. 570 (1968).
122 Id. at 583 (emphasis in original).
123370 F.2d 788 (6th Cir. 1967).
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interest is found in the opinion, perhaps because the state itself had
difficulty mustering up a legitimate one. In view of the seeming
irrelevance of petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus to the question of
eligibility for probation, the only evident purpose of the statute was to
penalize and thus deter the assertion of a federal right.' The
situation is comparable to the denial of tax exemptions to those with
unpopular beliefs,' or to the penalization by adverse comment at trial
of those who exercise the right not to incriminate themselves. 6
Invalidation of an inhibiting practice where the manifest intent
and inevitable effect of the statute are not to punish the assertion of
protected rights requires evaluation of the state interest. Several
decisions evidence a failure to make a thorough examination. In
Patton v. North Carolina,127 the Fourth Circuit held a harsher sentence
meted out after retrial of a defendant to be constitutionally defective.
The court utilized an unconstitutional condition analysis, but investi-
gated possible state interests only under its alternative ground of
denial of equal protection. State interest is relevant to both argu-
ments, however. The court found that meting out harsher sentences
on retrial was neither a rational system for sentence revision nor a
rational means for discouraging frivolous appeals. Although sentence
revision would be applied only to those who had pursued postconviction
remedies, the court saw no reason why this group would be particularly
likely to have unduly lenient sentences warranting review.'m Further-
more, rather than striking at those presenting frivolous appeals, the
practice subjected only those whose appeals were successful to the
possibility of harsher sentencing at retrial.m
124 See notes 68-69 supra and accompanying text. Also, consider the dissenting
remarks of Mr. Justice Fortas in United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 126 (1966)
(joined by Douglas, J.), where the Supreme Court reinstated indictments dismissed
below on the grounds of double jeopardy. The Court held that reindictment for addi-
tional offenses arising from an original indictment but not contained in it did not
violate the fifth amendments protection against double jeopardy. The dissenting
Justices could not agree:
In the present case it appears that the purpose as well as the effect of the
Government's action was to discourage the exercise of the right, conferred by
statute, to seek review of criminal convictions. According to the District
Court, the only reason advanced by the Government for the multiplication of
charges against appellees was that the prosecutor wanted to discourage others
convicted of narcotics offenses from attacking convictions.
Id. at 128. Further, Mr. Justice Fortas stated:
Apart from considerations of the impermissible purpose . . . this technique
has the necessary effect of unlawfully burdening and penalizing the exercise
of the right to seek review of a criminal conviction under federal law. This,
in my opinion, is forbidden by the Due Process Clause.
Id. at 129-30.
125 See notes 70-72 supra and accompanying text.
126 See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
127 381 F.2d 636 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 905 (1968).
128 381 F.2d at 642.
1
2
9 Id. at 643. Additionally, the court cited to an article which cogently and
methodically destroys any possible arguments on behalf of state interests. Id. at 642
n.17 (quoting and citing Van Alstyne, In Gideon's Wake: Harsher Pewdties and the
"Successful" Criminal Appellant, 74 YALE L.J. 606, 683 (1965)).
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Without evaluating the state's interests, the Patton court indi-
cated that the means chosen were ill-suited to any possible legitimate
ends and served to discourage the exercise of a constitutional right.130
A broad prohibitory rule was fashioned by the court: the sentence at
the second trial can never be harsher than that at the first, at least
where indictments are identical. 3 ' The court recognized that certain
circumstances might be revealed at a second trial which would warrant
harsher punishment, but it stated:
Against the rare possibility of inadequacy [of punishment],
greater weight must be given to the danger inherent in a
system permitting stiffer sentences on retrial-that the added
punishment was in reaction to the defendant's temerity in
attacking the original conviction. Even the appearance of
improper motivation is a disservice to the administration
of justice." 2
The court analogized the need for a broad prohibitory rule in Patton
to the need the Supreme Court found in Gideon v. Wainwright'3 3 -
eliminating the heavy chance of undetectable prejudice. 3 ,
A more finely honed rule might have been appropriate. The rule
announced by the district court in Patton 155-and also by the First
Circuit in Marano v. United States '3 8-may strike a better balance
between remedying the constitutional infringement and the state's
legitimate interest in providing sentences shaped to the individual case.
Such a rule would require that there be substantial concrete justification
in the record if a sentence is to be hiked. If sentences were adjusted
only for meaningful differences at the second trial, appeals would not
be discouraged to the same extent, for defendants would no longer be
deterred by the spectre of purely retributive sentences by judges intent
on discouraging appeals. Arguably, however, while the rule would
be formally complied with by judges, the determination of actual
judicial motivation would be so difficult that nothing short of Patton's
broad rule would eliminate the discouragement.3
The decision of the Supreme Court in United States v. Jackson 138
130 See note 79 supra, discussing the application of the least restrictive alternative
principle in unconstitutional condition cases.
'3'1381 F.2d at 641. But cf. United States v. Boyce, 352 F.2d 786 (4th Cir. 1965),
where the court did not apply the Patton rationale because the second trial was a
consolidation of the original indictment with others.
132 381 F.2d at 641.
133 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
1
3 4 See id. at 344.
135 256 F. Supp. 225, 235 (W.D.N.C. 1966), noted in. 80 HARv. L. REv. 891 (1967).
136 374 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1967).
137 The problem of discouraging defendants by indicting them on additional counts
still remains and has been held constitutionally permissible. See United States v.
Ewell, 381 U.S. 116 (1966), discussed note 124 supra.
138 390 U.S. 570 (1968). Subsequent to the decision in Jackson, the Court held
the right to jury trial in "serious" criminal cases guaranteed against state denial by
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145 (1968).
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more thoroughly explored the government's interest even though the
Court ultimately found that the procedure operated to discourage the
assertion of the rights to trial and to trial by jury. The district court
had dismissed the count of the indictment charging violation of the
federal kidnaping act,1" 9 holding the entire statute unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the
sentencing provision alone was unconstitutional and that it was
severable from the rest of the statute.' °  Rejecting the government's
construction of the statute ' and its position that those defendants
taking jury trial were not subjected to a substantially greater risk
of receiving the death penalty than those taking trial by the court or
pleading guilty, the Court found that the "[ilnevitable effect of . . .
[the] provision [was] . . to discourage assertion of the Fifth
Amendment right not to plead guilty and to deter exercise of the Sixth
Amendment right to demand a jury trial." 14
Acknowledging the existence of a congressional objective to
ameliorate the severity of the capital punishment provision by allowing
death to be dealt out only by a panel of twelve citizens, the Court found
that the goal could have been effectuated by means which did not chill
the exercise of constitutional rights.4'4 Thus, the availability of less
139 Whoever knowingly transports in interstate . . . commerce, any person
who has been unlawfully . . . kidnaped . . . and held for ransom . . . or
otherwise . . . shall be punished (1) by death if the kidnaped person has
not been liberated unharmed, and if the verdict of the jury shall so recon-
mend, or (2) by imprisonment for any term of years or for life, if the death
penalty is not imposed.
18 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (1964) (emphasis supplied).
140 The Court refused to follow the government's suggestion to order all federal
judges sitting in kidnaping cases to reject all guilty pleas and jury waivers. Although
conceding that defendants had no constitutional right to plead guilty, the Court reasoned
that the inauguration of such a drastic change in the administration of the statute
should be done only pursuant to congressional direction. 390 U.S. at 584-85. The
appellee's brief had argued that, although the statute or its administration could be
remedied so as not to conflict with the exercise of constitutional rights, by invalidating
the entire punishment provision the death penalty might be "nudged toward extinction"
because Congress will have to re-enact the death penalty if it wishes to attach it to this
crime. Brief for Appellee, at 24-25, United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
141 The government urged that the risks for those taking trial by the different
forms were not significantly different, because the statute (1) authorized a judge to
empanel a jury solely for sentencing after a non-jury determination of guilt and (2)
gave the judge discretion to nullify a jury's death sentence recommendation. 390 U.S.
at 572-73. But the Supreme Court rejected both contentions and, after delving into
the legislative history and cases, concluded that "the defendant who abandons the right
to contest his guilt before a jury is assured that he cannot be executed [while] the de-
fendant ingenuous enough to seek a jury acquittal stands forewarned that, if the jury
finds him guilty and does not wish to spare his life, he will die." 390 U.S. at 581.
142 Id. (footnote omitted).
143 A district court had stated that while it recognized that the statute places an
obstacle in the path of the exercise of the right to jury trial, it was "necessary to
compare the degree of the 'obstacle' against the value of the policy which it imple-
ments." Laboy v. New Jersey, 266 F. Supp. 581, 585 (D.N.J. 1967) (dictum). It
concluded that the benefit from an essentially similar state procedure was sufficiently
great that the court was not compelled to strike it down in favor of the "unobstructed
choice of a trial by jury." Id.
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restrictive alternatives, such as leaving the choice between death or
imprisonment to a jury in all cases, tipped the scales against the
governmental interest.'"
The issues involved in Garrity v. New Jersey'54 and Spevak v.
Klein"4 6 are perhaps even more complex. Consideration of these cases
involves not only the accommodation of competing state and individual
interests, but also a determination of the precise scope of the constitu-
tional privilege against self-incrimination. In Garrity, two policemen
testified during a statewide investigation of traffic-ticket fixing. They
had been advised of their fifth amendment right against self-
incrimination, but were told that if they refused to answer any questions
material to their employment, they would be fired under the state
forfeiture-of-office statute. 47 Their subsequent conviction on the basis
of their testimony was upheld by the state supreme court.1
4
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the threat of dismissal
for nondisclosure rendered the resultant statements "involuntary" and
hence inadmissible at trial. 49 The Court proceeded from the articula-
tion of the pressure inherent in the choice faced by the policemen to
the conclusion that their statements were in fact coerced. Heretofore,
the constitutional standard had been whether an inquiry into all the
surrounding circumstances would lead to the conclusion that a de-
fendant's will had "been overborne and his capacity for self-
determination critically impaired." ',0 But as argued earlier,'-' dis-
cussion in terms of coercion in fact inhibits an examination of the state
interest that should be made in evaluating conditions placed on govern-
mental benefits.
Underlying the evidentiary exclusion of statements produced
through coercion has generally been the attempt to deter undesirable
14 In the Jackson opinion, the Court explicitly incorporated the requirement set
out in first amendment cases for the evaluation of procedures challenged as unconsti-
tutional discouragements: that the means be narrowly suited to the ends, at least when
less restrictive means are available. 390 U.S. at 582. See notes 68, 79 supra and the
third part of the Bagley formulation of the standards to be met by conditions attached
to benefits, set out in text accompanying note 81 supra. Appellee's brief in Jackson
emphasized the existence of other methods that would eliminate the differential risks
producing the constitutional infirmity of the statute. For example, a special jury could
be empaneled in all cases to determine punishment. Brief for Appellee at 26, United
States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968). The defendant arguing before a jury that he is
innocent could not practically argue that even if he is, he shouldn't receive the death
penalty for certain reasons. Yet he could argue both propositions before separate
juries. Id. at 24. The brief argues, however, against the desirability of any type of
jury sentencing. Id. at 26.
14 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
146 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
147 N.J. Rxv. STAT. § 2A:81-17.1 (Supp. 1967).
148 State v. Naglee, 44 N.J. 209, 207 A.2d 689 (1966).
149 385 U.S. at 497-98.
150 Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961) ; see Davis v. North Caro-
lina, 384 U.S. 737, 742 (1966).
151 See text accompanying notes 116-22 supra.
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police tactics, rather than concern for factual reliability.' But with
Garrity, it is not realistic to characterize the attorney general's remarks
to the policemen concerning dismissal as a reprehensible strong-arm
procedure aimed at wearing down individual free will. The pressure
that was admittedly brought to bear on the individuals was the product
of a state legislative judgment that employees who do not cooperate in
answering questions relevant to their official conduct should be dis-
missed. Behind this legislation were two primary state interests:
first, the state's need to secure information from its employees about
their official conduct, information that is normally only obtainable
through their cooperation; and second, the state's desire to weed out
disloyal and incompetent employees. The weeding is done by dis-
missing both those who will not disclose relevant information and
those who are shown to be untrustworthy. 3 However, these interests
of the state as an employer are not advanced by utilization of the
threat of prosecution on the basis of the information elicited. In fact,
an employee faced with that prospect will be even more reluctant to
talk, even though silence may mean the loss of his job.
As an enforcer of the criminal law, the state has an additional
interest in prosecuting persons guilty of crime. But evidence obtained
under threat of dismissal cannot be viewed in a vacuum. By its
statutory policy the state encourages disclosure, and by so doing it
discourages the assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination,
even though the pressure cannot really be characterized as negating
free will. In support of its decision in Garrity, the Court cited
Miranda v. Arizona,"M where the Court had found that interrogation
under certain circumstances was likely to discourage assertion of the
right against self-incrimination55 and served no overriding state
interest. 6 The evidence was held inadmissible as a matter of law
unless certain enunciated safeguards were followed.'5 7 But the analogy
is imperfect because in Miranda the state's interest was solely as
prosecutor, while in Garrity, it was as employer as well. In Garrity
a parallel safeguard might have been to forbid entirely the state's
practice of firing for nondisclosure. To do so, however, would defeat
the state's legitimate interest as employer. To condition the benefit
15 2 See Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 519 (1963); Rogers v. Richmond,
365 U.S. 534, 540-41 (1961). See also State v. Naglee, 44 N.J. 209, 218, 207 A.2d 689,
694 (1965), rev'd sub nora. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
:53 Helpful discussion of the competing state and individual interests appears in
Ratner, Consequewces of Exercising the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 24
U. Cm. L. Rav. 472, 493-511 (1957) ; 70 -ARv. L. REv. 120 (1956) ; Note, Mandatory
Dismissal of Public Personnel and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 101
U. PA. L. REv. 1190 (1953).
154 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
',5 Id. at 457-58, 467.
t56 Id. at 479-81.
157 Id. at 479.
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of public employment on the answering of questions directly relevant
to performance of the job is to place a highly pertinent qualification on
the benefit. As has been seen, narrowly drawn conditions may legiti-
mately be attached to benefits if they are necessary to prevent the
benefit from being subverted and used to the detriment of the public." s
By ruling out the use of the statements for prosecution, the Court left
the state's interest qua employer intact while protecting the individual's
right against compulsory self-incrimination.' Thus the decision in
Garrity seems a proper accommodation of the competing interests.160
Unfortunately, however, the articulation of the decision belied no
such consideration by the Court. In the wake of the sweeping language
of Garrity and its companion case, Spevack v. Klein,'6' confusion
reigned." Spevack held that the Constitution prohibited disbarment
of an attorney for claiming the privilege against self-incrimination at a
168 See notes 80-82 supra and accompanying text.
That the questions be relevant to the individual's performance of official duties is
demanded by the general requirement that conditions attached to benefits be narrowly
drawn. In Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956), the Court held
it arbitrary and unreasonable action for a state to dismiss a teacher for having 12
years before invoked the fifth amendment when questioned by a federal body investi-
gating subversive organizations. One crucial factor that distinguished Slochower,
however, is that there was no demonstration in Slochower of any relevance of the ques-
tions asked to the teacher's competence. In Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, 362 U.S.
1 (1960), and Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958), the Supreme Court accepted the
state's determination that membership in certain "subversive" organizations was rele-
vant to an evaluation of fitness for public employment. It would seem, however, that
in most cases dismissal for refusal to answer questions seeking such information would
be unconstitutional. See cases cited notes 76-77 supra. But cf. Pickering v. Board of
Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (different state interests in regulating speech of
employees and individuals), quoted note 49 supra; Meehan v. Macy, 392 F.2d 822 (D.C.
Cir. 1968) (regulation of speech of policeman).
159 This resolution of the issue prevents infringement of what might be termed the
core of the constitutional right-the protection against criminal prosecution through
the use of compelled testimony-although encroachment is admittedly made on the
penumbra. Cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). See Mansfield,
The Albertson Case: Conflict Between the Privilege Against Self-Incrimniation and
the Government's Need for Information, 1966 Sup. CT. REV. 102, 142-43 (P. Kurland
ed. 1966).
Sometimes it is well that the privilege bend in order that it not break. The
essentials of the privilege are not necessarily sacrificed by requiring disclosure
of information when the use to which it is put is controlled and limited.
Id. at 160.
360 An analogous situation in which accommodation of individual and govern-
mental interests may be necessary involves Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting to the adoption of the rule, stated:
To deny a defendant the opportunity for discovery . . . merely because the
defendant chooses to exercise the constitutional right to refrain from self-
incrimination arguably imposes a penalty upon the exercise of that fundamental
privilege.
383 U.S. at 1092. Justice Douglas recognized that "fairness may require disclosure,"
but indicated that the rule should be narrowly drawn so as to require that the matter
discovered be related to that sought to be discovered by the defendant. Id.; see Smith
& McCollom, Counterdiscovery in Criminal Cases: Fifth Amendment Privileges
Abridged, 54 A.B.A.J. 256 (1968).
161 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
16 See id. at 530-32 (dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice White); cf. Uniformed
Sanitation Men Ass'n, Inc., v. Commissioner of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280, 285 (1968)
(Harlan, J., concurring).
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judicial inquiry into his conduct. The case might have rested on the
grounds that, as the conduct occurred prior to the Court's decision in
Garrity, the attorney could not have known that Garrity would bar
subsequent prosecution and therefore his refusal to testify at that
time was a valid assertion of the right. Under this theory, the state
could on remand question him again, and disbar him for continued
refusal to speak.'68 The opinion, however, made no such suggestion,
and left open the possibility that states were barred from either
prosecuting or removing from employment (by firing, if a state
employee, or by withdrawal of a professional license) persons who
refused on fifth amendment grounds to testify concerning possible pro-
fessional misconduct.
Much of the confusion may have been dispelled by two cases
decided last term, Gardner v. Broderick ' and Uniformed Sanitation
Men Association v. Commissioner of Sanitation.'6 5  The Court
in those cases struck down a provision of the New York City Charter
requiring dismissal of public employees 166 who either claimed the fifth
amendment right to refuse to testify or refused to sign a waiver of
immunity from prosecution on the basis of their testimony. The
issue was whether the state could attempt to coerce a waiver of the
immunity conferred by Garrity "on penalty of the loss of employ-
ment." 16 Invalidating the provision and the dismissals, both decisions
distinguished the case where the employee was not asked to waive his
immunity from criminal prosecution but was only required to answer
questions relevant to his employment. The Court noted:
If appellant, a policeman, had refused to answer questions
specifically, directly, and narrowly relating to the performance
163 The privilege against self-incrimination has been held to be available only
where giving testimony may possibly lead to criminal prosecution; where a witness's
reasonable fear of prosecution has been removed, the privilege is inapplicable. Ullmann
v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 431 (1956). A judicial expression of immunity by the
Supreme Court has recently been available to compel testimony in a state court. In
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. .52 (1964), after holding that any testimony
(or the fruits thereof) compelled under a state immunity statute could not be used in
a federal prosecution, the Court stated that the reasonable fear of the defendants of
possible prosecution had been removed. "It follows that petitioners here may now be
compelled to answer the questions propounded to them." Id. at 79. But cf. Mansfield,
supra note 159, at 162-65, suggesting that information cannot be compelled except
pursuant to a statutory grant of immunity. Whenever immunity is extended, however,
it must be coextensive with that guaranteed by the fifth amendment. Ullmann v.
United States, supra at 430-31. It need not bar all prosecution for any offense dis-
closed, but only the use of the testimony or its fruits in prosecution. Murphy v. Water-
front Comm'n, supra at 78-79; see id. at 92-107 (White, J., concurring).
16 392 U.S. 273 (1968), noted in 46 GEO. L.J. 813 (1968).
165 392 U.S. 280 (1968).
16 6 The charter also provided that they would be permanently ineligible for any
employment under the city or any agency thereof. Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273,
275 n.3 (1968). The New York State Constitution contained a similar but not identi-
cal provision. Id.
16 7 Id. at 279. The Court refused to speculate whether a waiver so compelled
would be valid under Garrity. Id. at 278-79.
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of his official duties, without being required to waive his im-
munity with respect to the use of his answers or the fruits
thereof in a criminal prosecution of himself, Garrity v.
New Jersey . . the privilege against self-incrimination
would not have been a bar to his dismissal.' s
The companion case makes it clear that the element of criminal
prosecution is the key factor in triggering the privilege: New York
was seeking "not merely an accounting . . .of their public trust, but
testimony from their own lips which, despite the constitutional pro-
hibition, could be used to prosecute them criminally." "o
In light of Broderick and Uniformed Sanitation Men, then, the
situation becomes much clearer. Just as the state can compel production
of testimony by contempt sanctions for refusal to disclose, it can likewise
compel the testimony by the sanction of dismissal (or withdrawal of a
license) for refusal to testify.170 In either case, however, if testimony
is compelled the individual must be granted immunity from criminal
prosecution on the basis of the testimony.17' Furthermore, it would
appear that at least dismissal of public employees may be based on the
testimony thus compelled; that is, such a proceeding is not a "criminal
case" within the reach of the immunity.'7 In both Broderick and
106SId. at 278 (footnote omitted). Similar language is contained in Uniformed
Sanitation Men, 392 U.S. at 284.
1G9 Id. (footnote omitted).
170 Justices Black and Douglas have argued, however, that in their view the fifth
amendment's privilege is rooted in the concern for the public ignominy and disgrace to
which one is subjected by an admission of guilt, and that therefore it can never be
avoided by immunity statutes or rules. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 440
(Douglas & Black, JJ., dissenting); cf. McKay, Self-Incrimination and the New
Privacy, 1967 Sup. CT. REv. 192, 230 (P. Kurland ed. 1967).
171 Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967); see Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964). But cf. George Campbell Painting Corp. v. Reid, 392
U.S. 286 (1968). Campbell Painting involved a challenge to another New York
statute, this one requiring that all public contracts contain a clause providing that upon
the refusal of any person to testify before a grand jury, answer any relevant question,
or waive immunity from subsequent criminal prosecution, such person and any cor-
poration of which he might be a member, officer or director should be disqualified
from contracting with any public authority for 5 years, and that any existing public
contracts with the person or his corporation could be cancelled with impunity. The
Court did not reach the constitutional issue, arguing that the fifth amendment privilege
could be raised only by a natural person. Justices Douglas and Black dissented, argu-
ing that no "penalty--direct or collateral-can be imposed on anyone for invoking a
constitutional guarantee." Id. at 290.
172 See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), which, although often cited
for the proposition that the privilege is applicable to cases of forfeiture, was explicitly
limited to forfeitures imposed as a direct penalty for an offense against the law.
Id. at 634.
In Niedziejko v. Board of Fire & Police Comm'rs, 33 Wis. 2d 488, 149 N.W.2d
547, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 848 (1967), a post-Garrity decision, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court upheld the dismissal of a policeman on the basis of information elicited under
threat of discharge. Cf. In re Delahanty, 380 App. Div. 542, 115 N.Y.S.2d 614, aff'd,
304 N.Y. 725, 108 N.E.2d 46 (1952), where contempt sanctions were upheld for a
refusal to testify when the individual was subject only to forfeiture of his job with the
state.
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Uniformed Sanitation Men, the Court alluded to the propriety of
dismissal of employees for failure "to account for their performance
of their public trust" where no waiver was required.'73 These words
would seem to imply that a dismissal could be based on the compelled
testimony; "account" presumably implies a satisfactory accounting.
The Court in Broderick noted that "the policeman is either responsible
to the State or to no one." 7 To rule that the state may discharge an
employee for refusing to testify, but that when the testimony reveals
incompetent or dishonest performance of duty by its employees, the
state must retain them in its service-harming both the state as
employer and the public served by the employee-would be to carry
the privilege beyond any reasonable bounds. Allowing dismissal under
both circumstances would put the state qua employer in the same
position as a private employer, while at the same time protecting the
private individual's privilege against self-incrimination by providing
immunity from prosecution on the basis of his testimony.
A distinction may still exist with respect to the withdrawal of
professional licenses held by, for example, lawyers or doctors. Al-
though the states have traditionally been given considerable discretion
in the regulation of the practice of law,'1 5 language in Broderick seems
to indicate that the Court will distinguish between the state's interest
as employer in discharging its unfaithful servants and its interest as
licensor in disbarring a wayward attorney:
It is argued that although a lawyer could not constitutionally
be confronted with Hobson's choice between self-incrimina-
tion and forfeiting his means of livelihood, the same principle
should not protect a policeman. Unlike the lawyer, he is
directly, immediately, and entirely responsible to the city or
state which is his employer. He owes his entire loyalty to it.
He has no other "client" or principal..
We agree that these factors differentiate the situationsy
Speaking in traditional terminology, the withdrawal of a license
is much more akin to punishment than is withdrawal of a job.
7 7  If
173 Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Commissioner of Sanitation, 392 U.S.
280, 285 (1968) ; see Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 278-79 (1968).
174 392 U.S. at 278.
175 See, e.g., In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961) ; Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366
U.S. 36 (1961).
176 392 U.S. at 277-78 (footnote omitted).
177 In re Ungar, 26 App. Div. 2d 925, 282 N.Y.S.2d 158, cert. denied sub nor.
Ungar v. Association of the Bar, 389 U.S. 1007 (1967), upheld the disbarment of an
attorney on the basis of testimony compelled under a grant of immunity from criminal
prosecution. If valid, this would suggest that disbarment proceedings are not
"criminal" for purposes of the fifth amendment. In Zuckerman v. Greason, 20 N.Y.2d
430, 231 N.E.2d 718, 285 N.Y.S2d 1 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 925 (1968), the
New York Court of Appeals upheld the suspension of a lawyer on the basis of testi-
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so, then under the Garrity rationale, immunity from disbarment on the
basis of the testimony would have to be granted in order to compel
testimony by the sanction of disbarment for refusal to testify."
Whether the scope of the privilege is to be extended to encompass this
result should be resolved through an analysis of the respective state and
individual interests. When a policeman (or garbage man) is dis-
charged, he is not prevented from engaging in similar work for a
private company; his job is forfeit, but his means of livelihood is not.
When a doctor's or a lawyer's license to practice is withdrawn, he is
prevented from engaging in his profession anywhere in the state. In
view of the greater significance of the forfeiture and the less direct
interest of the state, greater weight may be given to the licensee's
interest, tipping the balance in his favor.Y9
A GLANCE FORWARD
Given the recent applications of the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions, the next likely target may well be the practice of guilty
plea bargaining, both judicial and prosecutorial.
Judicial Bargaining
A guilty plea, if induced by promises or threats that deprive it of
voluntary character, is void, and a conviction based on such a plea is
inconsistent with due process of law."s  In harmony with this prin-
ciple, it has been held that a plea of guilty is involuntary if made subse-
quent to a judge's statements to a defendant that he will be lenient if
a guilty plea is entered and harsh if it is not.'' It has also been held
that a harsher sentence imposed on a defendant because he persisted in
a claim of innocence and insisted that the state prove his guilt is
a penalty placed on the exercise of fifth amendment rights, and such a
mony secured under threat of disbarment: "[N]either Garrity nor Spevack confers
upon [lawyers] the constitutional privilege to withhold evidence which cannot lead to
criminal prosecution and bears only upon their right to continue to practice law."
20 N.Y.2d at 438-39, 231 N.E.2d at 721, 285 N.Y.S.2d at 6. But see In re Ruffalo,
390 U.S. 544, 550 (1968): "Disbarment . . . is a punishment or penalty imposed
upon the lawyer." Id. at 551: "These are adversary proceedings of a quasi-criminal
nature."
178 Presumably, if the state employed the lawyer, it would be able to discharge
him on the same reasoning that allows it to discharge the policeman.
179 However, should the rationale developed here with respect to governmental
employees prevail as to licensees whose conduct is closely supervised by the state, the
residual requirement that the questions asked be relevant to the professional perform-
ance would become extremely important to the protection of the first amendment
rights of both members and applicants to the bar. Cf. discussion in note 158 supra and
cases cited note 175 supra.
1so See Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962) ; Waley v. Johnston,
316 U.S. 101 (1942).
181 See, e.g., Euziere v. United States, 249 F.2d 293 (10th Cir. 1957); United
States ex rel. Elksnis v. Gilligan, 256 F. Supp. 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) ; United States v.
Tateo, 214 F. Supp. 560 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); cf. United States ex rel. McGrath v.
LaVallee, 319 F.2d 308, 319-24 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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sentence is subject to collateral attack." Similarly, the denial of con-
sideration for probation because a defendant has asserted the right to
trial operates as a penalty upon that right. 3
It is profitable to view these cases as instances where a positive
benefit within the state's granting power-leniency-is conditioned on
the non-assertion of a constitutional right-either the right to deter-
mination of guilt by trial embodied in the due process clauses or the
right to jury trial guaranteed by the sixth amendment.' The
exercise of the constitutional right is penalized when an otherwise
available benefit is withheld.' Judge Weinfeld, granting a defend-
ant's motion in United States v. Tateo 186 to set aside his conviction
on the grounds that his guilty plea had been coerced by improper
judicial pressure, stated:
No matter how heinous the offense charged, how over-
whelming the proof of guilt may appear, or how hopeless the
defense, a defendant's right to continue with his trial may
not be violated. His constitutional right to require the
Government to proceed to a conclusion of the trial and to
establish guilt by independent evidence should not be exer-
cised under the shadow of a penalty-that if he persists in
the assertion of his right and is found guilty, he faces, in
view of the Trial Court's announced intention, a maximum
sentence, and if he pleads guilty, there is the prospect of a
substantially reduced term. To impose upon a defendant
such alternatives amounts to coercion as a matter of law.'1
7
While in Tateo, the defendant had succumbed to the offer, in United
States v. Wiley .8 the defendant had insisted on trial and received
182 See Thomas v. United States, 368 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1966) (exercise of super-
visory power).
183 United States v. Wiley, 278 F.2d 500 (7th Cir. 1960). The case had originally
been remanded to the district court for resentencing without the penalty. On the
second remand, the district court followed the instructions of the circuit court in 278
F2d 500, but not without a lengthy defense of its previous sentencing procedures.
United States v. Wiley, 184 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Ill. 1960). Cf. Gillespie v. State, 355
P.2d 451 (Okla. Comm. App. 1960), where the denial of an application for a suspended
sentence was reversed on state law grounds. "A policy designed to deny defendant a
suspended sentence solely because he demanded a jury trial is contrary to law and an
unjustifiable denial of defendant's rights to have his application for a suspended sen-
tence considered upon its merits." Id. at 456.
18 4 See note 138 supra.
185 Although courts have distinguished between threats of punishment and prom-
ises of leniency, their coercive impact on defendants is similar, because a threat
of punishment is really an implicit promise of benefit if one acts in the desired manner.
The distinction is useful, however, if one wishes to take a middle position on the issue
of inducing guilty pleas, drawing the line separating the permissible from the invalid
at formal prosecutorial bargains embodied in a framework of minimal procedural
safeguards.
188214 F. Supp. 560 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
187Id. at 567 (footnotes omitted).
188 278 F.2d 500 (7th Cir. 1960).
UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS
a consequent penalty when the judge, according to his standard prac-
tice, withheld consideration for probation. The defendant who has
to make this choice has suffered an interference with the free exercise
of a constitutional right regardless of his decision, and has standing
to assert a constitutional claim to that effect."8 9
Where convictions or sentences have been reversed because of
judicial bargaining as to the form of trial, courts have found the
existence of pressure in the record. 90 While there has been broad
language announcing that any suggestion of differential sentencing by
judges is coercion as a matter of law, 9 the cases make factual findings
regarding coercion of the pleas. Some courts have not found sufficient
evidence of coercion in spite of intimidating judicial remarks.' 92 Under
the theory of infringement through discouragement that has been
advanced in this Comment, however, in any case where it appears that
a judge has indicated that he will sentence differently depending on
the plea, the state has put the defendant to an unconstitutional choice.1
93
The penalty on assertion and the premium on non-assertion of their
189 One who wishes to raise the issue of infringement in some instances has as-
serted his rights and has consequently borne a penalty-the revocation or withholding
of a benefit. Can he then claim an interference with the free exercise of his consti-
tutional rights? An analogy can be drawn from cases where the Supreme Court has
found substantial and immediate injury to individuals challenging statutes for vague-
ness in the first amendment area. A case from the Fifth Circuit suggests that criminal
defendants have standing where they have been deprived of the benefit because of
asserting a constitutional right. In Thomas v. United States, 368 F.2d 941 (4th Cir.
1966), after trial, the judge advised the defendant that if he persisted in his professions
of innocence, he would receive a longer sentence than otherwise. The defendant per-
sisted and received the maximum sentence. In reviewing a denial of his motion for
sentence correction by the district court judge, the court of appeals rejected the gov-
ernment's argument that since the defendant had exercised his privilege against self-
incrimination, thereby retaining the rights to appeal and to collateral attack, he came
through the dilemma "unscathed" and could not protest the sentence. Noting the de-
fendant's "terrible dilemma" the court stated:
When Thomas received harsher punishment than the court would have de-
creed had he waived his Fifth Amendment rights, he paid a judicially imposed
penalty for exercising his constitutionally guaranteed rights.
Id. at 946 (footnote omitted). The court specifically disclaimed reaching the constitu-
tional issue, and instead depicted its decision to vacate the sentence as an exercise of
its supervisory power over the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts.
When it is realized that but for the assertion of the constitutional right, an individual
would enjoy a substantial benefit, it seems fair to view him as an appropriate indi-
vidual to challenge such action as inhibitory of constitutional rights.
190E.g., Euziere v. United States, 249 F.2d 293 (10th Cir. 1957) ; United States
ex rel. Elksnis v. Gilligan, 256 F. Supp. 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) ; United States v. Tateo,
214 F. Supp. 560 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Letters v. Commonwealth, 346 Mass. 403, 193
N.E.2d 578 (1963). Where the record has been uninformative, relief has been denied.
See, e.g., United States v. Farrar, 346 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1965).
191 See text accompanying note 187 supra.
192See, e.g., United States v. Cariola, 323 F.2d 180 (3d Cir. 1963); People v.
Bernatowicz, 35 Ili. 2d 192, 220 N.E,2d 745 (1966).
198 The fact that a practice that is inimical to constitutional rights is not embodied
in a statutory framework makes it no less open to constitutional attack. While em-
bodiment in a statute makes the procedure more susceptible of judicial remedy, because
a statute can be simply invalidated, Patton v. North Carolina, 281 F.2d 636 (4th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 905 (1968), illustrates the ability of courts to fashion a
remedy to prevent, unconstitutional discouragement of rights- through, certain non-
statutory practices.
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constitutional rights is sufficient to induce many defendants to abandon
them. It may be argued that the withholding of leniency is not a
penalty, but the argument is essentially a semantic one, for the effect
of withholding a benefit has been recognized to operate as a punishment
and a deterrent to the exercise of individual rights.
Whether the judicial practice of sentencing more harshly those
who refuse to plead guilty or who demand a jury trial is nevertheless
justifiable is still to be considered. While cogent arguments may be
advanced that the exigencies of the judicial administration of the
criminal system necessitate the maintenance of a system of inducements
to pleading guilty,194 it is doubtful that judicial bargaining with the
defendant is either necessary or desirable for the effectuation of that
interest.'9 5 First, the judge should symbolize as well as be an im-
partial arbiter at trial. For him to engage in influencing the de-
fendant in such a manner destroys that image. In an analogous
context, the Fourth Circuit has stated, "Even the appearance of im-
proper motivation is a disservice to the administration of justice." '"
Second, the judge is arguably in a position to exert even more psycho-
logical pressure on a defendant than the prosecutor, since he usually
passes on the sentence. 197  Differential sentencing according to plea
has been justified on grounds that a guilty plea indicates repentence, 98
while a sentence after trial often is influenced by implied findings of
perjury or a frivolous defense, or by the revelation of dramatic facts
during trial. 99 Yet, differential sentencing on these bases has been
shown to be frought with imposing constitutional, statutory, or policy
weaknesses. 00 In sum, the justifications for perpetuation of disparate
sentencing by the judiciary, based on waiver or assertion of rights, are
weak in view of the discernible discouraging effect that the procedure
has on constitutional rights.
194 See text accompanying notes 219-20 infra.
195 See generally Note, Judicial Plea Bargaining, 19 STANq. L. Rv. 1082 (1967);
Comment, The Influenwe of the Defendant's Plea on Judicial Determination of Sentence,
66 YALE L.J. 204 (1956).
I" Patton v. North Carolina, 381 F.2d 636, 641 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 905 (1968).
19' See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Maroney, 423 Pa. 337, 223 A.2d 699 (1966):
"Our concept of due process must draw a distinct line between, on the one
hand, advice from and 'bargaining' between defense and prosecuting attorneys
and, on the other hand, discussions by judges who are ultimately to determine
the length of sentence to be imposed."
Id. at-349, 223 A.2d at 705 (quoting United States ex rel. McGrath v. LaVallee, 319
F.2d 308, 319 (2d Cir. 1963) (Marshall, I., dissenting)) (footnote and citation
omitted).
198 United States ex rel. Starner v. Russell, 378 F.2d 808 (3a Cir. 1967).
199 Pilot Institute on Sentencing, Proceedings, 26 F.R.D. 231, 287-89 (1959).
2oo See Comment, The Influence of the Defendant's Plea on Judicial Determiiiation
of Sentence, 66 YALr L.J. 204 (1956).
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There still remains the problem of remedy. Although one study
has shown that, at least in the federal courts, the majority of judges
consider the plea in determining sentence,201 whether a particular judge
in a particular case has or has not is difficult to determine. One can
at least say that whenever the transcript contains remarks by a judge
directed to a defendant suggesting that leniency will be extended if
a guilty plea is entered, then the conviction should be reversed on the
ground that the plea was involuntary as a matter of law. Furthermore,
whenever the defendant rejected the bargain and the benefit was with-
held, which fact could be determined either by the remarks in the record
or by clear evidence of disparate sentences between co-defendants ex-
plainable only on grounds of differences in pleas, the sentence should
be reconsidered. 2
Where a general practice is tacitly pursued, however, a judicial
remedy may be ineffectual, yet the coercive impact on defendant is just
as real. Defendants often plead guilty from experience and general
anticipation of substantial sentencing benefits."0 3 The low visibility
of the phenomenon and the difficulty of a comprehensive solution
should not deter a court from announcing a rule of partial effectiveness.
By reversing sentences where leniency was clearly withheld or punish-
ment clearly rendered because of the exercise of constitutional rights,
the tacit policy may be undermined, because the courts will be less
able to trade on the defendant's expectations. Additionally, if judges
could not use disparate sentencing to encourage guilty pleas or waiver
of jury trial, the utility of judicial sentencing to the state would be
diminished. This in turn may help to trigger the demise of judicial
sentencing altogether, an attractive prospect for many critics of the
criminal adjudicatory system. 04
2
01 Id. at 206-07, 222. Tallies of the writers' questionnaire sent to federal judges
indicated that (1) 87% agreed it was accepted practice to sentence more lightly after
a guilty plea, and (2) 667 admitted that they themselves took the plea into account
in determining sentence. Also see United States ev rel. Starner v. Russell, 378 F.2d
808, 811-12 (3d Cir. 1967) :
Furthermore, it has always been the rule in both the federal and state system
that leniency is always extended on pleas of guilty that is not extended when
defendants go to trial, and the petitioner, having had competent counsel, must
have been aware of this situation.
See Dewey v. United State , 268 F.2d 124 (8th Cir. 1959).
202 Such evidence was utilized by the court in United States v. Wiley, 278 F.2d
500 (7th Cir. 1960), where a defendant, who was only a minor accessory in the crime,
stood trial before a judge and received a 3-year sentence while his more culpable co-
defendants, including the ringleader, received sentences of 2 years or less.
2 03 See D. NEWMAN, Co1vcrioN: THE DETERmINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE
WrrHOUT TRLkr 60-66 (1966) [hereinafter cited as CoNvicrioN]. This work is the
most comprehensive treatment thus far of the entire process of plea bargaining.
204 See, e.g., Dash, Cracks in the Foundation of Criminal Justice, 46 ILL. L. REv.
385, 404 (1951) (footnotes omitted) :
A necessary step is the divorcement of the sentencing power from the
court. While there are many other reasons why this change in procedure is
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Prosecutorial Bargaining
It has thus far not been held that the normal bargains of the
prosecutor violate constitutional rights of individuals by discouraging
the exercise of the right to trial or by penalizing those asserting the
right. °5 Prosecutorial bargaining takes many forms, all of which are
directed toward a single objective: persuading the defendant to plead
guilty by offering him an irresistible benefit. Prosecutors, for exam-
ple, will offer to recommend leniency to the judge, to reduce the charge
to a lesser included offense, to dismiss another indictment, to do some
beneficial act toward someone dear to the defendant, or even to
refrain from taking action against such a person?" Although many
guilty pleas are the result of bargains,20 7 prosecutorial bargains have
often been considered integral elements of the criminal adjudicatory
process," rather than coercive instruments.
necessary for the betterment of the administration of criminal justice, it is in
any event a change that will directly wipe out the dangers of the reduced
plea. With the court no longer in a position to offer lesser sentences, there
will be no advantage to the defendant in pleading guilty to a misdemeanor.
The trial under such a system will serve its only proper function, the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Most judges today
admit that they are incompetent to sentence. As a result of their insecurity
and lack of knowledge in this field, they seize on any pretext to shift the
burden, and have welcomed the chance to give light sentences on a plea of
guilty to a lesser offense. The sentencing power could be given to a treatment
board made up of experts in the fields of psychology, psychiatry, and sociology.
Its approach would be on an individualized basis and hinged on the problems
and needs of the particular defendant.
205 The Supreme Court refused to consider a case involving a statutorily imposed
bargaining system for traffic offenses, for want of a substantial federal question.
Marder v. Massachusetts, 346 Mass. 408, 193 N.E.2d 695 (1963), appeal dismissed per
curiam, 377 U.S. 407 (1964). Justices Douglas and Goldberg dissented. 377 U.S. at
407. Mr. Justice White would have noted probable jurisdiction. Id. The case in-
volved a Massachusetts statute which gave individuals the choice of paying a $3 fine
or going to trial at the risk of receiving harsher punishment. The Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court, in upholding the statute against a constitutional due process
attack, expressed grave doubts concerning the validity of such a procedure in the case
of more serious offenses.
2 0 6 See generally Cowvicrlox 29; Note, Oficial Inducements to Plead Guilty:
Suggested Morals for a Marketplace, 32 U. Ci. L. REV. 167 (1964) ; Note, Guilty
Plea Bargaining: Compromises by Prosecutors to Secure Guilty Pleas, 112 U. PA. L.
REv. 865, 866-68 (1964).




208 See, e.g., Cortez v. United States, 337 F.2d 699, 701 (9th Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 381 U.S. 953 (1965); Barber v. Gladden, 220 F. Supp. 308, 314 (D. Ore.
1963), aff'd, 327 F.2d 101 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 971 (1964). Some courts
have taken exception, however, where the prosecutor's bargains have not been kept and
have either found pleas "involuntary" on review or found a vaguely defined violation
of due process through gross unfairness. See CoNvIcrIoN 36; Note, Guilty Plea Bar-
gaining, supra note 206, at 877-78 (1964). However, it is difficult to see the relevance
of whether or not the bargain was kept to an inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea
or the constitutionality of a system of official inducements to waive constitutional rights.
In Shupe v. Sigler, 230 F. Supp. 601 (D. Neb. 1964), a conviction was reversed even
though the prosecutor's bargain not to prosecute the defendant as an habitual criminal
was kept. The decision, however, was heavily influenced by the lack of counsel during
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But at least one decision indicates that, in the federal system,
guilty pleas can be found lacking in involuntariness to the extent that
a bargain by a prosecutor was a motivating force inducing the accused
to enter his plea. In Shelton v. United States,209 two dissenting judges
considered the question in the case to be one of due process and of "a
fundamental requirement of our system that the machinery of the law
in no way be used to bring about the guilty plea and its awful finality
unless it represented the general free expression of the prisoner's
will." 210 In Shelton the benefit offered was dismissal of an addi-
tional count and an indictment in another district along with a recom-
mendation for a specific sentence. When the benefit is release from
the risk of a death sentence, there would be additional impetus toward
a finding of a coerced plea, but courts have not responded even to this
limited extent.211
The question of plea bargaining was raised by the briefs before
the Supreme Court in United States v. Jackson.212 The government
took the position that by invalidating the federal kidnaping penalty
scheme as an impairment of the right to trial and jury trial, the Court
would of necessity clear the way for the invalidation of prosecutorial
plea bargaining because that procedure similarly offers inducements to
individuals to forego constitutional rights. Such a result would "rob
the criminal process of much of its flexibility, and would almost
certainly lead to generally heavier penalties" for defendants. 13 The
appellee's brief distinguished the Jackson inducement from those of
prosecutors on the basis that not all charge reductions and dismissals
are inducements, while the federal kidnaping act involves a statutory
inducement applicable in all cases.2 14 Additionally, the statutory format
the bargaining process. See id. at 606; cf. Alden v. Montana, 234 F. Supp. 661, 670
(D. Mont. 1964), aff'd, 345 F.2d 530 (9th Cir. 1965). In Harrell v. United States, 371
F.2d 160 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 923 (1967), postconviction relief was denied
a defendant whose bargain with the prosecutor had not been kept. The court relied
heavily on the record, which indicated that the defendant had attested to the volun-
tariness of his plea at trial and that no promises had been made.
209 246 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1957) (en banc), rev'd on confessior of error by the
Solicitor General, 356 U.S. 26 (1958).
210 246 F.2d at 580 (Rives & Brown, JJ., dissenting). It was suggested that the
very argument of the majority in favor of the normal practice of plea bargaining con-
cedes that the promises and commitments by prosecutors are effective to induce pleas.
Id. at 579.
211 See, e.g., Martin v. United States, 256 F.2d 345 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 921 (1958); Commonwealth v. Maroney, 423 Pa. 337, 223 A.2d 699 (1966).
212 390 U.S. 570 (1968). See notes 139-44 supra and accompanying text.
213 Brief for Appellant at 6-7, United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
The Supreme Court's opinion in Jackson discusses the possibility of forbidding the
district courts to accept guilty pleas as one method of correcting the constitutional
defect in the federal kidnapping provision. This suggestion was rejected by the Court
because to take away the power to accept guilty pleas would rob the criminal process
of flexibility. 390 U.S. at 584-85. However, the Court did not speak to the issue of
plea bargaining, which, even if held to be unconstitutional, would not necessarily pre-
clude courts from accepting guilty pleas by defendants.
214 Brief for Appellee at 9-10, United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
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of the scheme made it readily amenable to remedy,2 15 while the problems
of plea bargaining might be, in a practical sense, beyond the reach of
judicial review.21
In some cases charges are reduced or counts dismissed simply
because the original charges were mistaken and as such are not a
result of an intention to promote a guilty plea. In others reduction
is specifically made to induce the plea. A judicially formulated rule,
to effectively prevent prosecutorial inducements might have to take
the form of a broad prohibitory rule against any guilty plea which
has been preceded by a reduced charge or dismissal of an additional
count. While this type of rule would not prevent pre-indictment
conferences between the accused and the prosecutor where a bargain
may be struck, it would force such bargains to be made under con-
ditions that would diminish the predictability of results between the
parties. This would tend to reduce their usefulness to the government
and hence their incidence.
It may be argued that the accused will receive harsher treatment
under such a rule because he will no longer get the benefit of being
charged and sentenced for a crime less severe than that which he
committed. The obvious retort is that defendants should not be getting
such benefits because it distorts the legislated relationship between
punishment and offense. Charge reductions and dismissals have been
justified as necessary in order to alleviate unduly harsh legislative pro-
visions.2 17  Ruling out bargained pleas, however, will not prevent the
prosecutor from gratuitously using his discretion to reduce indict-
ments. Furthermore, the real focus should be on changing the laws,
not on perpetuating a system that may erratically alleviate their effect.
While in some cases the prosecutor may be stuck with unrealistically
aggravated charges not reducible under the proposed rule, he will soon
learn to make well advised decisions about which charges to prosecute.
A system freed of plea bargaining would eventually be more beneficial
to defendants because the constitutional rights to trial could be exer-
cised in an atmosphere that is in fact free."'
215 Id. at 10. The problem of retroactivity, of course, remains, but since the judg-
ment would be a ruling that is protective in nature, not resting on a specific finding of
coercion, but rather on the consideration that rights are likely to be discouraged and
no strong countervailing policy is served by perpetuation of the procedure, the benefit
of the decision need not be extended retroactively. The appellee's brief stated that
since the infringement is against procedural rights, the Court would be free to limit
retroactivity. Id. at 30 n.2 9.
216 The appellee's brief concluded that the possibility that "[a] prosecutor could
often avoid even this constellation of restrictions by negotiating with the defendant
before the initial charge is framed" might make the charging process "largely beyond
the reach of courts." Id. at 10.
217 CoNvicTioN 177-82.
218 After exploring the various effects that such a rule would have, the appellee's
brief in Jackson states: "About all that would be confined by outlawing charge re-
ductions . . .would be the freedom of the prosecutor to induce the defendant to
plead guilty to a crime which he did not commit." Brief for Appellee at 12, United
States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. at 570 (1968).
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CONCLUSION
The process of both prosecutorial and judicial bargaining parallels
those procedures recently invalidated because of the great deterrent
pressure they exert on the assertion of constitutional rights. Those who
assert their right to trial on the merits are effectively penalized when
leniency which would otherwise be accorded is withheld. Yet, analysis
is incomplete without an examination of countervailing governmental
justifications based on equally fundamental concerns. As has been
argued above, such a judgment is both appropriate and indispensable.
It has been repeatedly asserted that prosecutorial plea bargaining
is essential to the administration of criminal justice,21 and that if it
were to be abandoned, the resultant increase in trials would put a
severe strain on an already overburdened system 2 °0 Administrative
costs would soar, and new facilities as well as additional lawyers and
judges would be needed. Perhaps most important, the speediness of
trials would be drastically affected, leading either to an increase in the
period of time spent in pretrial incarceration for many defendants or
the release of prisoners who could not be tried consistent with current
standards of speediness in trials.
These may, however, turn out to be problems only of a
transitional phase, when the system is adjusting to the demands of
trying many more individuals accused of crimes. In any event, the
Supreme Court, were it to consider the question, would have to
weigh (1) the substantiality of the discouragement of the exercise of
constitutional rights, (2) the extent to which these rights should be
protected, and (3) the countervailing public interest bolstering the
present procedure, including whether this interest could be served by
less restrictive alternatives. Depending on its faith in the ability of
society to marshal resources to approach the constitutional ideal of
adjudication of guilt by trial embodied in the fifth amendment and the
contemporary evaluations of that ideal, the variables in this equation
will be given differing weight.
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is an analytical tool
for the articulation of the deterrent force in operation when benefits,
for example leniency in the criminal process, are conditoned on the
waiver of fundamental constitutional rights. But every condition
that puts an individual to a difficult choice cannot be deemed un-
219 E.g., Shelton v. United States, 242 F.2d 101, 115 (5th Cir. 1957) (Tuttle, 3.,
dissenting). This opinion became the majority opinion after an en banc hearing. 246
F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1957), rev'd on confession of error by the Solicitor General, 356 U.S.
26 (1958). See Barber v. Gladden, 220 F. Supp. 308, 314 (D. Ore. 1963) ; CoulCrxoN
39; Note, supra note 206, 881 (1964). Newman announces the sobering statistic that
"[r]oughly ninety per cent of all criminal convictions are pleas of guilty." CoNVlc-
TIoN 3.
2 2 0 See Ohlin & Remington, Sentencing Structure: Its Affect Upon Systems for
the Administration of Crintinal Justice, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 495, 500 (1958);
Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining, supra note 206, at 881-82.
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constitutional. If that were the case, the doctrine would have become
distilled to as rigid a concept as the one it was first developed to
combat-the privilege-right dichotomy. In sum, the doctrine pro-
vides a useful vocabulary for expressing the causal impact that manip-
ulations of governmental benefits have on individual choices within
the ambit of constitutional rights. Lest it assume expansive pro-
portions without logical perimeters, however, it must be utilized with
considerable sensitivity to the equities and competing interests in
specific constitutional contexts.
